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1 Introduction 
Evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of international business transactions presents vexing 
challenges for the legal comparativist and practitioner.  Divergent legal regimes impact business 
decisions, as commercial transactions extending across different legal jurisdictions may produce 
different and perhaps unexpected results.  Exclusively relying on black-letter law does not 
sufficiently capture the entire comparative landscape.  Rather, evaluating how black letter law, 
or law-in-the-books, reacts with law in practice presents the optimal analytical vantage point.1  
Such approach necessitates that a credible, neutral and objective method evaluates the 
international business transaction — one which considers that economic, cultural and 
sociological viewpoints, perhaps competing, all exist.  These analytical methods, while providing 
valuable reference points, do not independently present a complete picture.2  Rather, a hybrid 
comparative theory, objective pluralism, incorporating all of these methodologies, is a more 
effective evaluator tool providing the optimum means for evaluating comparative commercial 
law issues.3  The totality of this review presents a balanced perspective offering unique issue 
insights. 
Part one introduces the need for objective modes of comparative law analysis within the context 
of international business transactions, most notably contractual relationships.  Discussing the 
disparate common and civil law families evidences why objective methods are necessary to 
explore legal problems extending over systematic divergences.  Focusing on how good faith 
under comparative contract law is interpreted quite differently between (and within) these 
families demonstrates that legal concepts transplanted across legal families may have different 
meanings.  Part two explores how black letter law is applied in practice, through the lens of 
objective pluralism, yielding nuances while providing comparativists with an important toolkit 
to further “test” a legal problems.  The economic comparative method is evaluated, with special 
focus given to efficiency and transaction-based economic methodologies.  Next, the sociological 
comparative method is analyzed, with emphasis on behavioral theory.  Relational contracting, 
which contains elements of economic-based methodologies, is subsequently reviewed.  The 
 
1 Palmer, Vernon Valentine, From Lerotholi to Lando: Some Examples of Comparative Law Methodology, 53 Am. J. 
Comp. L. 261, 266 (2005) (“the researcher must always delve beyond judicial decisions, doctrinal writings and the 
black letter law of code and statute and reach into the ill-defined region of “deeper structures” where law perhaps 
meets philosophy, sociology, and social culture”).  See also Goldfarb, Phyllis, Theoretics of Practice: The Integration of 
Progressive Thought and Action: Beyond Cut Flowers: Developing a Clinical Perspective on Critical Legal Theory. 43 Hastings 
L.J. 717, 737 (1992) (law-in-action indicates chaotic interplay of a wide variety of detail and doctrine, variables 
and values, people and perspectives). 
2 Halperin, Jean-Louis, Law in the Books and Law in Action: The Problem of Legal Change, 64 Me. L. Rev. 45, 47 (2011) 
(discussing the ongoing debate of “how to build a legal science without erecting a phantasmagoria of imagined law 
without connection to how law is actually used and actually works”). 
3 Note that this term was introduced in a philosophical context by Albert P. Brogan, Objective Pluralism in the Theory 
of Value 41 International Journal of Ethics 287-295 (1931). 
http://www.brocku.ca/MeadProject/Brogan/Brogan_1931.html. 
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paper then proposes the new methodology, objective pluralism, as the most efficient tool for 
analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of comparative business transactions.  Practical 
application of objective pluralism involves a carefully-constructed survey or empirical study. 
2 The Comparative Law Dilemma: The Need for Objective Standards, 
Divergent Systems 
Comparative law study, in its quest to examine the function and utility of legal concepts among 
various legal systems, demands objective, neutral comparative standards.  These standards 
allow a useful review of legal systemic commonalities and differences, unhindered by certain 
cultural-specific or innate characteristics which prevent evaluating the utility of an existing legal 
framework.4   
The comparative method consists of reviewing the similarities and differences between legal 
systems, while assessing the breath of differences which the comparative researcher must 
consider.5  One of the greatest challenges confronting comparative law projects remains the 
problem of equivalency: comparativists strive to prove how studied legal systems are similar or 
dissimilar.6  Rarely do different legal systems share precise equivalents, although certain rules 
and institutions may, in a broad sense, be quite similar—which is a vexing problem for the 
comparative law scholar.7  
Objective analytical devices yield important perspectives, allowing comparativists to focus on 
the similarities, and differences, between and among legal systems—presenting discoveries as 
to the unique aspects of the compared systems and how they commonly react to a specific issue.8  
The distinctive aspects of each system may be defined, while also creating an appreciation of 
legal system commonalities—which, together, create insights into a particular legal matter 
under review.9  Comparativists must also present reasons for the differences and similarities 
between divergent legal systems, and provide analysis as to their significance for the studied 
cultures.  Accordingly, comparative scholars argue that the legal analyst must look to, and 
beyond, the law, including “the respective political, economic, and social systems and historical 
traditions of which they are a part.”10  Effecting these goals is the real challenge, as scholars 
 
4  Substantial scholarship exists considering the various comparative law theoretical foundations. See, e.g.,  De Cruz, 
Peter, Comparative Law in a Changing World (Cavendish, 1999); Glenn, H. Patrick, Legal Traditions of the 
World (Oxford Press, 2007). 
5 Reitz, John C., How to Do Comparative Law, 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 617, 620 (1998).  
6 See id. at 622. 
7 See id.   
8 Reitz, John C., How to Do Comparative Law, 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 617, 624 (1998).   
9 See id.  
10 Reitz, John C., How to Do Comparative Law, 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 617, 627 (1998).   
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evaluating comparative systems must collect and analyze data gathered from “cultural neutral” 
sources.11  
2.1 Structural and Theoretical Differentiations: Civil and Common Law Traditions 
For comparative purposes, objective pluralism takes into account the different legal systemic 
constructs and cultural norms/perceptions which reflect decision-making existing between (and 
among) the civil12 and common legal traditions.  These traditions diverge in several areas, 
including the influence of precedent (stare decisis)13.  Under the civil law tradition, courts 
interpret and apply written laws, which include codes, 14 statutes and decrees.15  Hearkening 
back to its Roman tradition, civil law regimes often look to legal scholarship for assistance in 
determining the state of the law on a given subject, serving to organize principles and decisions 
into a legal framework.16  A civilian code17 serves as an elaboration of legal doctrines, rules and 
 
11 For interesting discussions on cultural influences within comparative law, see Jackson, John D., Playing the Culture 
Card in Resisting Cross-Jurisdictional Transplants: A Comment On Legal Processes and National Culture, 5 Cardozo J. Int’l 
& Comp. 51, 63 (1997).   
12 While recognizing that not all member legal regimes of the common or civil law legal traditions are identical, the 
similarities greatly outweigh any divergences.  Accordingly, this paper will not generally focus on the differences 
between members of the same legal traditions, such as, for example, those existing between Germany and France.  
Pejovic, Caslav, Civil Law and Common Law: Two Different Paths Leading to the Same Goal, 32 VUWLR 817, 818 n.3 
(2001) at www.upf.pf/IMG/doc/16Pejovic.doc citing to Schlesinger, R.B. et al, Comparative Law 282 (1998) (“Even 
though the civil codes of different countries are not homogenous, there are certain features of all civil codes which 
bind them together and “sets them apart from those who practice under different systems”). 
13 “The doctrine of stare decisis requires all tribunals of inferior jurisdiction to follow the precedents of courts of 
superior jurisdiction, to accept the law as declared by superior courts, and not to attempt to overrule their 
decisions.” Sellers, N.S. Mortimer, The Doctrine of Precedent in the United States of America, 54 Am. J. Comp. L. 67, 
86 (2006); see also Auto Equity Sales v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 369 P.2d 937, 939-940 (1962). For a 
comprehensive review of stare decisis’ historical development in the United States, see Sellers, N.S. Mortimer, The 
Doctrine of Precedent in the United States of America, 54 Am. J. Comp. L. 67 (2006). 
14 The civilian legal tradition is born through codification, with clear divisions between public and private law. 
Stein, Peter G., Relationships among Roman Law, Common Law, and Modern Civil Law: Roman Law, Common Law, and 
Civil Law, 66 Tul. L. Rev. 1591, 1595-1596 (1992).  For example, the exclusive source of private law under the 
civilian legal system is the written law, with systematized modern codes behind the civilian law’s reasoning.  Id. at 
1596. 
15 Freisen, Jeffrey L., When Common Law Courts Interpret Civil Codes, 15 Wis. Int’l L. J. 1, 7 (1996).  
16 Freisen, Jeffrey L., When Common Law Courts Interpret Civil Codes, 15 Wis. Int’l L. J. 1, 8 (1996).  See also Goutal, 
Jean Louis, Characteristics of Judicial Style in France, Britain, and the U.S.A., 24 Am. J. Comp. L. 43, 44 (1976); 
Cappalli, Richard B., Open Forum: At the Point of Decision: The Common Law’s Advantage over the Civil Law, 12 Temp. 
Int’l & Comp. L. J. 87, 94 (1998).  
17 Dainow defines “code” very broadly: “A code is not a list of special rules for particular situations; it is, rather, a 
body of general principles carefully arranged and closely integrated. A code achieves the highest level of 
generalization based upon a scientific structure of classification. A code purports to be comprehensive and to 
encompass the entire subject matter, not in the details but in the principles, and to provide answers for questions 
which may arise.” See Dainow, Joseph, The Civil Law and the Common Law: Some Points of Comparison, 15 Am. J. 
Comp. L. 419, 424 (1967). see also Apple, James G. and Robert P. Deyling, A Primer on the Civil-Law System, at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/CivilLaw.pdf/$file/CivilLaw.pdf. While recognizing that the 
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institutions.18  Alternatively, the common law family is composed of organic law, with judges 
reliant upon precedents and the persuasive effect of the works of other common law 
jurisdictions.19  Simply stated, common law is case law, with judicial decisions modifying new 
rules or adapting existing rules.20  By studying case holdings that underlie the reasoning behind 
a particular decision, the reach of a precedent, considering a decision’s origins and justifications, 
may be discovered.21  The common law thus provides an organic continuum of law “creation,” as 
each precedent builds upon, and into, the body of existing case law, providing future rules, 
definitions, branches or exceptions.22   
 
substantive law of civil (and common) law systems may differ among countries, certain “general features that 
distinguish the civil-law tradition from the common-law tradition” exist, according to Apple and Deyling.  Apple, 
James G. and Robert P. Deyling, A Primer on the Civil-Law System at 1 in http://www.fjc.gov/public/ 
pdf.nsf/lookup/CivilLaw.pdf/$file/CivilLaw.pdf. These authors note that “[C]ivil codes…emphasize form, 
structure, and the enumeration of both abstract and concrete principles of law within a unified whole. The 
reasoning process from code provisions is deductive—one arrives at conclusions about specific situations from 
general principles. The function of the jurists within and for the civil-law system is to analyze the basic codes and 
legislation for the formulation of general theories and extract, enumerate, and expound on the principles of law 
contained in and to be derived from them.” Id. at 19. 
18 Cappalli, Richard B., Open Forum: At the Point of Decision: The Common Law’s Advantage over the Civil Law, 12 
Temp. Int’l & Comp. L. J. 87, 93 (1998).   
19 Id. at 92.  It has been asserted that the common law has an “obsession” with noting the reason behind rules. Id. 
at 91.  
20 Freisen, Jeffrey L., When Common Law Courts Interpret Civil Codes, 15 Wis. Int’l L. J. 1, 11 (1996). American legal 
scholarship has extensively covered the modern emergence of so-called “super precedence” (or “super stare 
decisis”). See Sinclair, Michael, Precedent, Superprecedent, 14 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 363, 364 (2007) (“A super-
precedent would be so effective in defining the requirements of the law that it prevents legal disputes from arising 
in the first place, or, if they do arise, induces them to be settled without litigation”); Reese, Jessica, The Lone Second 
Amendment Interpretation: Has it Reached the Status of “Superprecedent?” 32 S. Ill. Univ. Law Jour. 211, 220 (2007) 
citing to Richmond Med. Ctr. For Women v. Gilmore, 219 F.3d 376  (4th Cir. 2000) (In discussion of landmark abortion 
rights case Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), reviewing Judge Lettig stated that, due to repeated confirmation by 
courts, Roe reached “super stare decisis” status).  A commentator suggests that several traditional factors may 
determine whether a reviewing court shall strictly follow a “superprecedent,” as opposed to depart from existing 
law, including the type of case the court is deciding, whether the precedent’s rule of law has been substantially 
relied upon by society, whether the court opinion serving as precedent as issued unanimously (or for a divided 
court), the decision’s age and whether a decision could be “workable” or creating a clear standard to guide state 
governments and lower courts. Reese, Jessica, The Lone Second Amendment Interpretation: Has it Reached the Status of 
“Superprecedent?” 32 S. Ill. Univ. Law Jour. 211, 221 (2007). 
21 Cappalli, Richard B., Open Forum: At the Point of Decision: The Common Law’s Advantage over the Civil Law, 12 
Temp. Int’l & Comp. L. J. 87, 89-90 (1998).  But see Pejovic, Caslav, Civil Law and Common Law: Two Different 
Paths Leading to the Same Goal, 32 VUWLR 817, 819 n.7 (2001) (Asserting distinction as to how stare decisis 
doctrine is applied by U.S. and English courts. “In the United States, under this doctrine a lower court is required 
to follow the decision of a higher court in the same jurisdiction. In England, the previous rule under which courts 
were bound by their own prior decisions was reversed by the House of Lords (Practice Statement) which declared 
that it considered itself no longer formally bound by its own precedents and announced its intention “to depart 
from a previous decision when it appears right to do so.” [1966] 1 WLR 1234”). 
22 Cappalli, Richard B., Open Forum: At the Point of Decision: The Common Law’s Advantage over the Civil Law, 12 
Temp. Int’l & Comp. L. J. 87, 93 (1998) citing to Cappalli, Richard B., The American Common Law Method 
(1997) (see Chapters 4, 10).  Stare decisis has been elevated as “the characteristic and all-pervading method of the 
common law,” The Right Hon. Lord Wright, Precedents, 8 Cambridge Law Jour. 118 (1943) cited in Sinclair, 
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Common and civil law theoretical divergences may also be found in perceptions of formalistic 
versus standards-based legal approaches, respectively.23  Formalism is understood as those legal 
rules which limit the interpreter’s focus to “a subset of materials that may or may not give rise to 
the same inferences as would the universe of materials as a whole.”24  Alternatively, standards-
based or “substantive” interpretive approaches involve attempting “to come to a more all-
things-considered understanding, based on all of the materials reasonably available.”25  Courts 
opting to involve formalist strategies often ensure compliance with all relevant legal formalities, 
follow rule-bound law and restrain judicial discretion as cases are decided.26  Freedom of 
contract theory is influential in the development of the common law’s more formalistic 
approach.27  Such perspective focuses on leaving the contracting parties to their own agreement, 
recognizing that contracting parties are free to enter into mutually beneficial economic 
exchanges.28  Under the common law interpretation, a court, absent demonstrable fraud, will not 
inquire into the bargain’s wisdom.29  Compare this to a civil law regime’s theoretical 
 
Michael, Precedent, Superprecedent, 14 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 363, 364 (2007). See also Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 
827 (1991) (Chief Justice Rehnquist held that stare decisis “promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent 
development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived 
integrity of the judicial process”).   
23 A scholar differentiates these legal interpretative perspectives by highlighting methods of evaluating formalism, 
as follows: “One sees the dichotomy expressed in terms of rules versus standards, rules versus discretion, textual 
versus contextual modes of interpretation, static versus dynamic interpretation, simplicity versus complexity, 
determinacy versus flexibility, objective versus subjective standards, and so on.  Each of these opposed pairs 
highlights different functional aspects of the formalism problem, but what they have in common is that the first 
member of each opposed pair connotes an interpretive approach that focuses on a more limited set of authoritative 
or evidentiary materials, and the second member connotes an approach that embraces or allows for the 
consideration of a more expansive set of materials.”  See Katz, Avery W., The Economics of Form and Substance in 
Contract Interpretation, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 496, 515 (2004). 
24 Id. at 498.   
25 Id. 
26 Sunstein, Cass R., Must Formalism be Defended Empirically?, University of Chicago Law School John M. Olin Law 
& Economics Working Paper No. 70 (2nd Series) at 3 (1999), found at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/ 
publications/working/index.html. 
27 Henrietta Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner, 52 F. 2d. 931, 934 (4th Cir. 1931) (“The court will not write contracts for the 
parties to them nor construe them other than in accordance with the plain and literal meaning of the language 
used”). see also Lu, Shumei, Gap Filling and Freedom of Contract (Master’s Thesis, University of Georgia) (2000) at 
http://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/ (last reviewed June 20, 2008). 
28 “The freedom of parties to structure their own agreement is universally acknowledged to be at 
the heart of the common law of contracts.” DiMatteo, Larry A., Theory of Efficient Penalty: Eliminating the Law of 
Liquidated Damages, 38 Am. Bus. L. J. 633, 634 (2001).  see also DiMatteo, Larry A., Theory of Efficient Penalty: 
Eliminating the Law of Liquidated Damages, 38 Am. Bus. L. J. 633, 641 (2001).   
29 Note that a growing legal movement, new American formalism, adopts a middle road: clear, direct interpretive 
guidelines should be legislated, which courts may interpret and refine through, ultimately, a body of caselaw.  
Charny, David, The New Formalism in Contract, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 842, 842-43 (1999); see also Katz, Avery W., The 
Economics of Form and Substance in Contract Interpretation, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 496, 505 (2004) (Courts must depart 
from traditional formalism in certain clear instances; the First Restatement of Contracts (First Restatement) (1932) 
made, for example, exceptions for fraud or mistake); Barnett, Randy E., The Richness of Contract Theory, 97 Mich. L. 
Rev. 1413, 1414-15 (1999) (book review). 
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underpinnings.  Namely, under a standards-based approach, civil law judges are empowered to 
utilize a flexible interpretation method, with the ability to examine the intent of the parties 
rather than be limited to a contract term’s literal meaning.30 
2.2 Good Faith Doctrine and the Role of Judges: Black-Letter Civil Law 
The contractual doctrine of good faith illustrates how seemingly similar commercial legal 
concepts may be interpreted and enforced quite differently in jurisdictions spanning across legal 
families.  Legal systemic differences, such as the differing role of judges, also affect the 
application of legal doctrine.  Such divergences demonstrate the need for comparative analysis 
of legal concepts via black letter law, while suggesting that a complementary law-in-action 
evaluative approach is also necessary. 
While common law courts historically avoid judicial intervention into the contracting parties’ 
relationship,31 the civil law systems allow the judiciary a more expansive opportunity to 
interpret the parties’ bargain.32  Such proactive judicial stance has been collectively identified as 
 
30 Garello, Pierre, The Breach of Contract in French Law: Between Safety of Expectations and Efficiency 
(http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/irlaec/v22y2002i4p407-420.html), 22 International Review of Law and Economics  
407, 412 (2003); see also Gordley, James, Contract Law in the Aristotelian Tradition, in The Theory of Contract Law 
266 (2001) (With respect to civil law, fairness and distributive justice are foundations of the binding force of 
contractual promises, rather than an individual will); Moss, Giuditta Cordero, International Contracts between 
Common Law and Civil Law: Is Non-state Law to Be Preferred? The Difficulty of Interpreting Legal Standards Such as Good 
Faith, 7 Global Jurist (Advances) 19 (2007).  
31 For a discussion of historical restraints by American judges to intervene, see Weigand, Tory, The Duty of Good 
Faith and Fair Dealing in Commercial Contracts in Massachusetts, 88 Mass. L. Rev. 174 (2004).   
32 For a description of the German legal regime, where courts have the power to rewrite a contract, see DiMatteo, 
Larry A., An International Contract Law Formula: The Informality of International Business Transactions Plus the 
Internationalization of Contract Law Equals Unexpected Contractual Liability, 23 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 67, 85-86 
(1997) citing to von Teichman, Germany, Federal Republic, in 1 Legal Aspects of Doing Business in Western 
Europe 205, 218 (Dennis Campbell ed., 1983).  see also Powers, Paul J., Defining the Undefinable: Good Faith and the 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 18 Journal of Law and Commerce 333-353 
(1999) found at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/powers.html#def (no page numbers online) (“Civil law 
states tend to use a more expansive approach to the good faith obligation applying it to both contract formation 
and performance. Common law states prefer a more narrow good faith duty applicable only to contract 
performance”).  Note that Powers continues that “The civil law approach to good faith is more encompassing than 
its common law counterpart. A civil law contracting party owes a pre-contract duty of good faith to negotiate fairly 
and openly with the other party. This obligation extends to contract performance and requires parties to act 
reasonably, or more specifically, not to breach the relationship of trust with those with whom they negotiate and 
contract.  Good faith is an important public policy in countries adhering to the civil law approach.  In these 
countries, good faith can be relied upon by both parties to a contract.” See also Moss, Giuditta Cordero, 
Commercial Contracts Between Consumer Protection and Trade Usages: Some Observations on the Importance 
of State Contract Law, in Schulze, R. (ed.), Common Frame of Reference and Existing EC Contract Law, 65, 68 
(2008) (“[T]he civilian judge has a larger power to evaluate the fairness of the contract and intervene to reinstate 
the balance of interests between the parties; he or she is more concerned with creating justice in the specific case 
than with implementing the deal in the most predictable manner.  In doing so, the civilian judge is guided by 
general clauses and principles of good faith and fair dealing”). 
  
Nordic Journal of Commercial Law 
Issue 2012#1 
7 
the “good faith” interpretation,33 where courts are empowered to address perceived gaps in the 
contracting parties’ bargaining relationship.  Civil law judges are thus able to use a subjective 
interpretation method, examining the good-faith intent of the parties rather than contract terms’ 
literal meaning.34  This standards-based approach is particularly evident in the Scandinavian 
legal context, as Bo Madsen describes its informal characteristics, evidenced by the recognition 
of contract formation on the basis of “social typical conduct,” judging contracts on the general 
requirement of “fairness,” interpreting contracts “pragmatically” (while taking into account the 
social and economic status of contracting parties) and, particularly in the consumer context, 
“employing in many connections “legal standards” which are often to be “filled out” in practice 
by quasi-legal bodies dominated by lay judges (e.g. The Consumers Complaints Board).”35   
Thus, the civil law tradition accepts that individuals are bound by certain conduct, even if not 
included specifically within the contract.36  While this may be captured in a statutory framework, 
as discussed below, it is accepted that legislatures “cannot foresee all possible situations.”37  
Similarly, contract law under the French system is viewed as a “shared undertaking,” with courts 
concerned that the parties adhere to their agreement and the law.  French courts attempt to 
compel contractual performance before resorting to finding for damages as substitution relief 
for a contractual breach’s “moral wrong doing.”38   
The Germanic system39 also has an ethical character, as the law is understood as a positive 
system of rules and a way to develop new rules and to tackle societal problems.40  Under the 
 
33 Good faith is defined as “an intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning or statutory definition, 
and it encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of design to 
defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage...” Black’s Law Dictionary 693 (1990). Mitchell, Andrew D., Good 
Faith in WTO Dispute Settlement, Melbourne J. Int’l Law, 14 (2006) (no page numbers available online) (In civil law 
context, good faith is “a principle of fair and open dealing”). 
34 Garello, Pierre, The Breach of Contract in French Law: Between Safety of Expectations and Efficiency, 22  International 
Review of Law and Economics  407, 412 (2003); see also Moss, Giuditta Cordero, International Contracts between 
Common Law and Civil Law: Is Non-state Law to Be Preferred? The Difficulty of Interpreting Legal Standards Such as Good 
Faith, 7 Global Jurist (Advances) 19 (2007) (“As opposed to common law, concepts such as good faith or fair 
dealing and rules governing contracts in general or a certain type of contract in particular may be invoked in civil 
law to interpret the contract, to integrate it or even to correct it”).   
35 Bo Madsen, Palle, Scandinavian Contract Law within the EEC: A Social Dimension in Contract Law by Harmonization 
or Recognition, in Perspective of Critical Contract Law 107, 109 (Thomas Wilhemsson, ed., 1992). 
36 De Ly, Filip, Commercial Law as a Refuge from Contract Law: A Comparative and Uniform Law Perspective, 45 Wayne 
L. Rev. 1825, 1854 (2000). 
37 Id. (Discussing the German legal tradition) 
38 Miller, Lucinda, Penalty Clauses in England and France: A Comparative Study, 53 ICLQ 79, 97-98 (2004).  For a 
comprehensive analysis of French law, see also Wells, Michael, French and American Judicial Opinions, 19 Yale J. Int’l 
L. 81, 99-100 (1994) (quoting Dawson, John P., The Oracles of the Law 401 (1968) in Farber, Daniel A., Book 
Review: The Hermeneutic Tourist: Statutory Interpretation in Comparative Perspective, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 513, 527 
(1996).   
39 DiMatteo, Larry A., An International Contract Law Formula: The Informality of International Business Transactions Plus 
the Internationalization of Contract Law Equals Unexpected Contractual Liability, 23 Syracuse J. Int’ L. & Com. 67, 70 
(1997).   
  
Nordic Journal of Commercial Law 
Issue 2012#1 
8 
German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, the “German Civil Code” or “BGB”) established in 
1900 (and revised in 2002), contracting parties are given broad freedom to structure their 
contractual relationships.41  German jurists tend to look more to the purpose of the legal 
instruments used, rather than the literal judicial interpretation of the language.42  German law 
does not restrict itself to a provision’s literal wording, but rather pursues interpreting the 
provision in a manner that best addresses the provision’s purpose.43  Context in determining the 
actual intent of a contractual provision is paramount, with the goal of ascertaining such 
intention the cornerstone of German contract interpretation.  Specifically, Article 133 of the 
German Civil Code holds that “When a declaration of intent is interpreted, it is necessary to 
ascertain the true intention rather than adhering to the literal meaning of the declaration.”44  It 
has also been asserted that Article 133 encourages contract interpretation “in light of the 
contractual economic purposes.”45  
The civil law judge may interpret contractual relationships to supplement, correct, or revise 
contracts.46  Initially, a civil law judge will review a contract in such a fashion that revision is 
unnecessary, although it may practically revise the contract, through judicial interpretation.  
Civil law courts will then seek to reform the contract in light of new circumstances, revising the 
agreement in what is perceived as the parties’ interests and intentions; if that fails, the entire 
 
40 De Ly, Filip, Commercial Law as a Refuge from Contract Law: A Comparative and Uniform Law Perspective, 45 Wayne 
L. Rev. 1825, 1854 (2000). See also Miller, Lucinda, Penalty Clauses in England and France: A Comparative Study, 53 
ICLQ 79, 100 (2004) (Noting that the French Civil Code often contains certain “abstract concepts,” such as good 
faith and morality, outside those traditionally found within the common law, in addition to doctrines of 
collaboration and loyalty.  Collectively, these principles create a so-called moralization of law which encourages 
judicial redrafting of agreements and produces uncertainty).   
41 Moss Giuditta Cordero, International Contracts between Common Law and Civil Law: Is Non-state Law to Be Preferred? 
The Difficulty of Interpreting Legal Standards Such as Good Faith, 7 Global Jurist (Advances) 12 (2007).  For the official 
English translation, see Bundesministerium der Justiz at http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_bgb/index.html.  For an interesting description of the historical development of German 
commercial law, see Zimmermann, Reinhard, The German Civil Code and the Development of Private Law in Germany, 
Oxford University Comparative Law Forum 1  (2006) at http://ouclf.iuscomp.org/articles/ zimmermann.shtml. 
42 DiMatteo, Larry A., An International Contract Law Formula: The Informality of International Business Transactions Plus 
the Internationalization of Contract Law Equals Unexpected Contractual Liability, 23 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 67, 70-
71 (1997).   
43 See id. see also Temkin, Harvey L., When Does the “Fat Lady” Sing?: An Analysis of "Agreements in Principle" in 
Corporate Acquisitions, 55 Ford. L. Rev. 125, 206 (1986) (citing to Calamari, John D & Joseph M. Perillo, Contracts 
2-7, at 30-33 (1977)).   
44 Official English Translation, Bundesministerium der Justiz at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/ 
englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.html - Section 133; see also DiMatteo, Larry A., An International Contract Law Formula: 
The Informality of International Business Transactions Plus the Internationalization of Contract Law Equals Unexpected 
Contractual Liability, 23 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 67, 71 (1997) citing to German Civil Code Book I, 133. 
45 DiMatteo, Larry A., An International Contract Law Formula: The Informality of International Business Transactions Plus 
the Internationalization of Contract Law Equals Unexpected Contractual Liability, 23 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 67, 71 
(1997) citing to Naglar, Nassar, Sanctity of Contracts Revisited: A Study in the Theory and Practice of Long-term 
International Commercial Transactions 44 (1995). 
46 De Ly, Filip, Commercial Law as a Refuge from Contract Law: A Comparative and Uniform Law Perspective, 45 Wayne 
L. Rev. 1825, 1854 (2000) (German jurist perspective).   
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contract will be voided.47  Norwegian jurists directly interpreting a commercial contractual 
relationship, or indirectly employing interpretative techniques to otherwise reach a perceived 
reasonable good-faith driven result,48 share qualities found under civil law systems.  According 
to DiMatteo, the German system believes that 
“the judiciary is very important as judges have to fill gaps that may exist, and have to 
develop the contracts and enforce them in accordance with both the parties’ intent and 
objective standards of reasonable and fair dealing.”49   
As such, the full, entire contractual relationship can be used to determine contractual intent “in 
the face of an instrument that indicates otherwise.”50  Civil law countries use rules which may 
not necessarily allow one to immediately reach conclusions from a rule’s application: such is the 
case with § 242 of the BGB (Treu und Glauben), through which judicial interventionism activates 
the rules operating as a delegation from the legislature to the judiciary “to fill gaps in the 
legislative system, to develop new rules, and to police contract law.”51  While § 242 allows 
adjusting contract law to meet new or specific circumstances, it has been proposed that the 
clause “may create unpredictability and uncertainties in contract law.”52   
Many of the civil legal regimes were substantially transformed in the early twentieth century, 
adopting good faith principles.  The German Civil Code’s proactive judicial character took roots 
soon in its formative period, and has been painted, through its proactive nature, as safeguarding 
certain value-laden contractual rights.  This is the perceived “good faith” approach, which often 
is at odds with the common law perception of freedom of contract.53 A clear example occurred 
 
47 DiMatteo, Larry A., An International Contract Law Formula: The Informality of International Business Transactions Plus 
the Internationalization of Contract Law Equals Unexpected Contractual Liability, 23 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 67, 85-
86 (1997) citing to von Teichman, Christoph, Germany, Federal Republic, in 1 Legal Aspects of Doing Business in 
Western Europe 205, 218 (Dennis Campbell ed., 1983).   
48 See Dalbak, Camilla, Lojalitetsplikt som grunnlag for å begrense og utvide fleksibilitet i avetaleforhold (particularly section 
2.2) (2007) at www.idunn.no.  
49 DiMatteo, Larry A., An International Contract Law Formula: The Informality of International Business Transactions Plus 
the Internationalization of Contract Law Equals Unexpected Contractual Liability, 23 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 67, 85-
86 (1997) citing to von Teichman, Christoph, Germany, Federal Republic, in 1 Legal Aspects of Doing Business in 
Western Europe 205, 218 (Dennis Campbell ed., 1983).  Schäfer, Hans-Bernd,  The Relevance of Law and Economics 
for Development of Judge Made Rules: Examples from German Case Law, 40 European Economic Review 989, 991 
(1996) (Large amount of German civil law based judge-made rules, filling legislative gaps).   
50 DiMatteo, Larry A., An International Contract Law Formula: The Informality of International Business Transactions Plus 
the Internationalization of Contract Law Equals Unexpected Contractual Liability, 23 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 67 
(1997). 
 
51 De Ly, Filip, Commercial Law as a Refuge from Contract Law: A Comparative and Uniform Law Perspective, 45 Wayne 
L. Rev. 1825, 1854 (2000).  See Bundesministerium der Justiz at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/ 
englisch_bgb/index.html.  
52 Id.   
53 De Ly, Filip, Commercial Law as a Refuge from Contract Law: A Comparative and Uniform Law Perspective, 45 Wayne 
L. Rev. 1825, 1849 (2000).  The Germanic principle of good faith performance may be traced to the Roman age, 
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during the 1920s, as German courts interpreted contract cases based on the notions of good 
faith and fair dealing under BGB § 242, and proposed that new obligations could be judicially 
supplemented into contracts under the Ergänzungsfunktion.54  Moreover, courts can draw on 
good faith to “interfere with contract terms, and prohibit the exercise of contractual rights, if this 
conflicts with fair dealing (Schrankefunktion).”55  Further, German courts may “adapt contracts 
to new circumstances as a result of a significant change in the circumstances that originally led 
to the conclusion of the contract, under the Korrekturfunktion.”56  The reviewing judge, under 
German Civil Code § 157, may thus fill in contractual gaps to ensure that the concept of good 
faith is adhered to.57  BGB § 242 goes even further, serving “as a barrier against enforcement of a 
contractual right, in case the exercise of that right brings to unfair results or disrupts the balance 
of interest between the parties.”58  Finally, the German Law on General Business Conditions or 
AGB-Gesetz (AGBG) voids contract provisions which work to disadvantage a contract party in a 
manner “irreconcilable with good faith.”59  In each of these examples, the German jurist holds 
broad powers, which, as exercised, allow direct access into the contractual relationship.  A 
French judge, similarly, may thrust elements of social and moral values into private bargaining, 
 
and reemerged during middle ages.  DiMatteo, Larry A., An International Contract Law Formula: The Informality of 
International Business Transactions Plus the Internationalization of Contract Law Equals Unexpected Contractual Liability, 
23 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 67, 85 (1997) citing to Anderson, Jill P., Lender Liability for Breach of the Obligation of 
Good Faith Performance, 36 Emory L. J. 917, 919-920 (1987). 
54 De Ly, Filip, Commercial Law as a Refuge from Contract Law: A Comparative and Uniform Law Perspective, 45 Wayne 
L. Rev. 1825, 1849 (2000). See also Weigand, Tory, The Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Commercial Contracts 
in Massachusetts, 88 Mass. L. Rev. 175 n.5 (2004) (Treu und Glauben provides that the “debtor is bound to effect 
performance according to requirements of good faith giving consideration in common usage”) citing to Powers, 
Paul J., Defining the Undefinable: Good Faith and the United Nations Convention on Contracts for International Sale of 
Goods, 18 J.L. & Com. 333 (1999). 
55 De Ly, Filip, Commercial Law as a Refuge from Contract Law: A Comparative and Uniform Law Perspective, 45 Wayne 
L. Rev. 1825, 1849 (2000). 
56 See id. 
57 Moss, Giuditta Cordero, International Contracts between Common Law and Civil Law: Is Non-state Law to Be 
Preferred? The Difficulty of Interpreting Legal Standards Such as Good Faith, 7 Global Jurist (Advances) 12 (2007);  see 
also DiMatteo, Larry A., An International Contract Law Formula: The Informality of International Business Transactions 
Plus the Internationalization of Contract Law Equals Unexpected Contractual Liability, 23 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 67, 
85 (1997) citing to von Teichman, Christoph, Germany, Federal Republic, in 1 Legal Aspects of Doing Business in 
Western Europe 205, 217 (Dennis Campbell ed., 1983) (Modern German Civil Code also voids contractual terms 
considered contrary to good faith). 
58 Moss, Giuditta Cordero, International Contracts between Common Law and Civil Law: Is Non-state Law to Be 
Preferred? The Difficulty of Interpreting Legal Standards Such as Good Faith, 7 Global Jurist (Advances) 12 (2007).  
Section 242 of the German Civil Code uses the good faith concept of Geschaftsgrundlage, or “basis of the bargain” 
to excuse performance. DiMatteo, Larry A., An International Contract Law Formula: The Informality of International 
Business Transactions Plus the Internationalization of Contract Law Equals Unexpected Contractual Liability, 23 Syracuse J. 
Int’l L. & Com. 67, 85-86 (1997) citing to von Teichman, Christoph, Germany, Federal Republic, in 1 Legal 
Aspects of Doing Business in Western Europe 205, 218 (Dennis Campbell ed., 1983).   
59 DiMatteo, Larry A., An International Contract Law Formula: The Informality of International Business Transactions Plus 
the Internationalization of Contract Law Equals Unexpected Contractual Liability, 23 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 67, 85 
(1997) citing to von Teichman, Germany, Federal Republic, in 1 Legal Aspects of Doing Business in Western 
Europe 205, 217 (Dennis Campbell ed., 1983).   
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as it is allowed to consider the parties’ bad (or good) faith, enabling the judge to examine the 
contract through many prisms.60  
2.3 Exploring Additional Divergences Outside and Within Legal Families: Norway and the 
Civil Law System 
Comparative review may discern complexities within a single legal family.61  Despite the overall 
consistencies with the civil law family, a comparativist must recognize key factors which 
distinguish the Norwegian (and Scandinavian) 62 legal tradition63  from other civil law traditions, 
including the lack of a systematic codification of the law of obligations, perceived elements and 
understandings of judicial pragmatism and a vibrant, pervasive goal, and sense, of social 
solidarity, which elevates equitable justice over individual autonomy.64  The Nordic model’s 
“harmonization” of contract law, in particular, stemmed from the shared history, language and 
continuing Nordic cultural unity, which is further based on “common ideological and political 
values.”65  The similarity in social ideals and the Nordic nations’ mutual development in the 
region created legal uniformity, with closeness made stronger through determined cooperation 
in legal issues, as evidenced in the “general clause.”66  The Nordic countries also share many 
traits in commercial laws, ranging from business registration rules to real estate acquisitions, 
 
60 Miller, Lucinda, Penalty Clauses in England and France: A Comparative Study, 53 ICLQ 79, 100-101 (2004).   
61 For discussions on divergent comparative contractual outcomes within a shared legal family, see Canuel, Edward 
T., Comparing Exculpatory Clauses under Anglo-American Law: Testing Total Legal Convergence, pp. 81-103, in Cordero 
Moss, Giuditta, et. al., Boilerplate Clauses, International Commercial Contracts and the Applicable Law 
(Cambridge Press, 2011) (Analyzing how Anglo-American courts interpret and apply exculpatory clauses, finding 
that the clauses have varying legal effects even within the same legal family). 
62 Norwegian law is grouped within the Scandinavian legal systems, classified as a separate legal family, but 
accepted as largely having its roots, particularly within contract law, in the Germanic legal tradition.  Moss Giuditta 
Cordero, International Contracts between Common Law and Civil Law: Is Non-state Law to Be Preferred? The Difficulty of 
Interpreting Legal Standards Such as Good Faith, 7 Global Jurist (Advances) 11 (2007).   
63 For a basic overview of the various Scandinavian legal systems, see Michael Bogdan, Comparative Law (1994); 
Zweigert, Konrad and Hein Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law (1987).  See also Pejovic, Caslav, Civil Law and 
Common Law: Two Different Paths Leading to the Same Goal, 32 VUWLR 817, 818 n.3 (2001) at 
www.upf.pf/IMG/doc/16Pejovic.doc (“The term “civil law” has two meanings: in its narrow meaning it designates 
the law related to the areas covered by the civil codes, while broader meaning of civil law relates to the legal systems 
based on codes as contrasted to the common law system”). 
64 Moss, Giuditta Cordero, International Contracts between Common Law and Civil Law: Is Non-state Law to Be 
Preferred? The Difficulty of Interpreting Legal Standards Such as Good Faith, 7 Global Jurist (Advances) 14 (2007).  
Unlike other Germanic-inspired countries, Norway has not codified its obligations law.  Rather, Norway has 
founded its contract interpretation on The Act on Formation of Contracts of 1918. See, e.g., Moss, Giuditta 
Cordero, International Contracts between Common Law and Civil Law: Is Non-state Law to Be Preferred? The Difficulty of 
Interpreting Legal Standards Such as Good Faith, 7 Global Jurist (Advances) 13 (2007) citing to Hov, J., Avtaleslutning 
og ugyldighet, Kontratsrett I, 60, 167-168 (2002). 
65 Bo Madsen, Palle, Scandinavian Contract Law within the EEC: A Social Dimension in Contract Law by Harmonization 
or Recognition, in Perspective of Critical Contract Law 107, 109 (Thomas Wilhemsson, ed., 1992). 
66 See id. 
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from patent protections to the sale of goods.67  Alternatively, the common law family is 
composed of organic law, with judges reliant upon precedents and the persuasive effect of the 
works of other common law jurisdictions.68   
The Scandinavian reasonableness rule has been held as not a dramatic departure from German 
law, particularly given that the good faith obligations found under the German Civil Code’s § 242 
“largely serve the same purpose of equitable justice.”69  A Norwegian jurist, similar to a German 
judge, would “correct the literal interpretation of a contract to avoid an unfair result, and would 
integrate the terms of the contract in case of gaps: it would go even further than a German court, 
and would correct the wording of the contract to achieve a better balance of interest between 
the parties, even if the [applicable] contract regulation does not lead to unfair results.”70  Similar 
contract interpretation is also found under Norwegian contract law, with respect to both 
performance and negotiations, which include “a duty to take into consideration the other party’s 
reliance on contractual negotiations, and in a duty to inform the other party of matters that 
might have a material significance for that party’s evaluation of the prospective contract.”71  
Further evidencing such interpretation of necessary equitable requirements, Cordero Moss 
notes that “§ 33 of the Act on Formation of Contracts provides that a contractual provision is not 
binding on a party, if enforcement thereof would be unfair because of circumstances that were 
known to the other party at the moment of conclusion of the contract.”72 
Focusing less on the individual freedom and more on justice and reasonableness than other 
civilian systems,73 the Norwegian judge enjoys broad flexibility in the interpretive process.74  
These underlying principles may be evidenced through contract formation requirements, a 
system which requires neither specific contractual form, nor invalidates oral agreements (which, 
under the Norwegian system, are as binding as a written contract).75  The Norwegian fact finder 
seeks the contracting parties’ objective intent, while strongly influenced in the context of 
 
67 See Gustafsson, Leif, Business Laws in the Nordic Countries: Legal and Tax Aspects (1998). 
68 Cappalli, Richard B., Open Forum: At the Point of Decision: The Common Law’s Advantage over the Civil Law, 12 
Temp. Int’l & Comp. L. J. 87, 92 (1998).  It has been asserted that the common law has an “obsession” with 
noting the reason behind rules. Id. at 91. 
69 See Moss, Giuditta Cordero, International Contracts between Common Law and Civil Law: Is Non-state Law to Be 
Preferred? The Difficulty of Interpreting Legal Standards Such as Good Faith, 7 Global Jurist (Advances) 15 (2007).   
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 16. 
73  Note that judicial roles vary among civil law legal regimes.  For general discussions as to the different approaches 
between the Germanic and French legal systems, see, respectively, DiMatteo, Larry A., An International Contract Law 
Formula: The Informality of International Business Transactions Plus the Internationalization of Contract Law Equals 
Unexpected Contractual Liability, 23 Syracuse J. Int’ L. & Com. 67, 70 (1997); Miller, Lucinda, Penalty Clauses in 
England and France: A Comparative Study, 53 ICLQ 79, 97-98 (2004). See also Pearce, Brian, The Comity Doctrine as a 
Barrier to Judicial Discretion:  A U.S.-E.U. Comparison, 30 Stan. J. Int’l L. 525, 567-570 (1994). 
74 Moss, Giuditta Cordero, International Contracts between Common Law and Civil Law: Is Non-state Law to Be 
Preferred? The Difficulty of Interpreting Legal Standards Such as Good Faith, 7 Global Jurist (Advances) 14 (2007).   
75 Gustafsson, Leif, Business Laws in the Nordic Countries: Legal and Tax Aspects 392 (1998).   
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contract law by the subject agreement’s purpose.76  Contract interpretation by the Norwegian 
judge will follow what is perceived to be the contract’s function.77  For example, given the 
absence in formal requirements, Norwegian law also considers it decisive that the “company or 
person who has issued a statement, written or orally, did so with the intention to establish rights 
and obligations between the parties considered.”78 
In short, Norway’s civil law framework emphasizes a standards-based review rather than a 
formalistic approach.79  Norwegian courts stress the flexibility of a judge, particularly in a quest 
to ensure compliance with good faith principles.  Gap-filling is a highly-accepted element of civil 
law legal regimes.  Civil law judges are empowered with far-ranging judicial tools, allowing them 
significant opportunities and ability to intervene as necessary when perceived contractual intent 
is violated.80  Providing a Norwegian judge procedural or interpretive flexibilities embraces legal 
realism goals, less concerned as to levels of judicial discretion and more focused upon avoiding 
static, rigid mechanisms which may promote mistakes or inequities.81  Within the contract law 
context, Section 36 of the Act on Formation of Contracts of 191882 provides Norwegian judges 
expansive interventionist powers, allowing them to either void or reformat a contractual clause 
deemed unreasonable.83  Norwegian judges either directly or indirectly use section 36.84 
 
76 Moss, Giuditta Cordero, International Contracts between Common Law and Civil Law: Is Non-state Law to Be 
Preferred? The Difficulty of Interpreting Legal Standards Such as Good Faith, 7 Global Jurist (Advances) 14 (2007).   
77 See id. 
78 Gustafsson, Leif, Business Laws in the Nordic Countries: Legal and Tax Aspects 392 (1998) (emphasis added).  
A discussion of how Norwegian law contends with oral contract amendments (and general analysis as to when 
American contracts are allowed to be oral in form), is found in Westly, Jens Christian, No Oral Amendments 
Clauses, paper presented in Norway at the Anglo-American Contract Model Project Seminar on June 16-17, 2008 
(on file with author). 
79 Civil law regimes often place great importance upon legislated codes which suggests a formalist approach.  
Germany provides an interesting example, as it codified the principle of good faith under section 242 of the 
German Civil Code, which provides a reviewing judge the power to render standards-based decisions. See 
Bundesministerium der Justiz at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/ englisch_bgb/index.html. 
80 See Miller, Lucinda, Penalty Clauses in England and France: A Comparative Study, 53 ICLQ 79,100-101 (2004); De 
Ly, Filip, Commercial Law as a Refuge from Contract Law: A Comparative and Uniform Law Perspective, 45 Wayne L. 
Rev. 1825, 1854 (2000). 
81 Katz, Avery W., The Economics of Form and Substance in Contract Interpretation, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 496, 497 
(2004) (“positive imperatives of lawmaking thus lead naturally to interpretive conventions that disfavor formalist 
decision-making”).   
82 The 1918 Act is composed of four separate chapters, with section 36 found in chapter three, dealing with 
contracts voided due to exploitation of another party’s weakness, fraud or duress. Krüger, Kai, Norsk Kjøpsrett 693 
n.70 (1999); Hagstrøm, Viggo, Obligasjonrett 275 (2003).  Prior to its amendments, the original section 36 did 
specifically address the concern that excess penalties could be misused.  
83 Swedish law specifically provides for an evaluation of the relative bargaining power of the parties in making the 
reasonableness determination. Section 36(2) of the Swedish Commercial Code provides that “particular 
consideration” shall be given to protecting the party “in a subordinate position in the contractual relationship.” 
DiMatteo, Larry A., Theory of Efficient Penalty: Eliminating the Law of Liquidated Damages, 38 Am. Bus. L. J. 633, 654 
(2001) citing to International Chamber of Commerce, Guide to Penalty and Liquidated Damages Clauses 38 
(1990). 
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2.4 Good Faith Doctrine and the Role of Judges: Black-Letter Common Law  
Anglo-American contract law varies significantly from the civil law interpretations of good faith, 
which also indicate the differing role held by judges.  Under the common law approach, good 
faith is found sporadically in certain areas, such as contract termination and good faith in 
negotiations.85  The common law system’s reluctance to integrate equitable principles between 
the contracting parties, such as good faith, evidences the importance stressed upon commerce 
and business, given that such principles may create uncertainty.86  Additionally, a civil legal 
regime’s good faith excuse for non-performance may result in contractual rescission, which 
would be nearly impossible to pursue, if ever, under the common law context.87  The common 
law tradition focuses more on remedies, or remedial satisfaction, but somewhat less on the 
rights and duties that are at its core, as compared to civil law’s concentration on the obligor’s 
duty of performance and the underlying right of the obligee to receive performance.88   
Under the U.S. interpretation, duties of good faith and fair dealing89 are “elusive and ill-defined,” 
with courts opting to address claims under such legal doctrines on an “individualized, fact-
 
84 See Hagstrøm, Viggo, Obligasjonrett 275 (2003); Woxholt, Geir, Avtalerett (2003); Dalbak, Camilla, 
Lojalitetsplikt som grunnlag for å begrense og utvide fleksibilitet i avetaleforhold (particularly section 2.2) (2007) at 
www.idunn.no. 
85 DiMatteo, Larry A., An International Contract Law Formula: The Informality of International Business Transactions Plus 
the Internationalization of Contract Law Equals Unexpected Contractual Liability, 23 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 67, 86 
(1997); see also Hillman, Robert A., An Analysis of the Cessation of Contractual Relations, 68 Cornell L. Rev. 617 
(1983); Weigand, Tory, The Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Commercial Contracts in Massachusetts, 88 Mass. L. 
Rev. 174 (2004).   
86 Moss, Giuditta Cordero, International Contracts between Common Law and Civil Law: Is Non-state Law to Be 
Preferred? The Difficulty of Interpreting Legal Standards Such as Good Faith, 7 Global Jurist (Advances) 1 (2007).  See also 
DeMott, Deborah A., Puzzles and Parables: Defining Good Faith in the MBO Context, 25 Wake Forest L. Rev. 15, 19 
(1990) (“A key component of business judgment analysis [in the U.S.], good faith, has always been a concept 
arguably unequalled for its malleability and formlessness”).  
87 DiMatteo, Larry A., An International Contract Law Formula: The Informality of International Business Transactions Plus 
the Internationalization of Contract Law Equals Unexpected Contractual Liability, 23 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 67, 85-
86 (1997) citing to von Teichman, Christoph, Germany, Federal Republic, in 1 Legal Aspects of Doing Business in 
Western Europe 205, 218 (Dennis Campbell ed., 1983); Moss, Giuditta Cordero, International Contracts between 
Common Law and Civil Law: Is Non-state Law to Be Preferred? The Difficulty of Interpreting Legal Standards Such as Good 
Faith, 7 Global Jurist (Advances) 1 (2007).   
88 Miller, Lucinda, Penalty Clauses in England and France: A Comparative Study, 53 ICLQ 79, 97 (2004).   
89 Good faith and fair dealing concepts are found in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the U.C.C., which 
is a uniform act promulgated to harmonize the law of the sale of goods and other transactions in the U.S., and 
adopted, in whole or in part, by all U.S. states.  For example, U.C.C. § 1-203 specifically refers to an obligation of 
good faith, and notes that every contract/duty within the U.C.C. imposes such good faith obligation. See also 
Farnsworth, E. Allen, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 666 (1983); Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 205 (“Every contract imposes upon each 
party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.”).  But see Weigand, Tory, The 
Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Commercial Contracts in Massachusetts, 88 Mass. L. Rev. 174, 177 (2004) citing 
to White, James J.  & Summers, Robert S., Uniform Commercial Code § 4 (1988) (U.C.C. is “not applicable to a 
majority of commercial transactions and leaves many issues such as contract formation to the “common law””).  See 
also Appellant Brief for Shelby Resources, LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, 2006 WL 4082450 at 2 (2006) 
(arguing that “weight of authority is that all of the common law should be applied to U.C.C. claims when it 
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specific basis.”90  Jurists have argued that such doctrines act as “an unwarranted invitation to the 
judiciary to impermissibly intrude into freedom.”91  In Massachusetts, for example, good faith 
and fair dealing were limited in the early 20th century to isolated cases, including the prohibition 
of employees using garnered business information with their former employer’s competitor, and 
protecting the vendee’s goodwill against the possibility of a vendor creating a rival business.92   
Confined to such limited instances, U.S. courts generally hold that the words and terms used in 
the contracting parties’ agreement must be given primacy.  This understanding embodies 
freedom of contracting principles.  The rationale is that the contracting parties, except in limited 
instances where public policy would otherwise be contravened, should have contractual 
freedom to dictate their own agreements.93  Unambiguous contracts are to be construed by 
courts within the agreements’ “plain terms” or “four corners,” where introducing any extrinsic 
evidence in contract disputes that contradict or supplement the agreement’s express terms were 
forbidden.94   
Recent U.S. decisions mainly reject alleged contractual breaches of the duty of good faith and fair 
dealing, and reemphasize the freedom of contract.95  Many modern opinions contain a repetitive 
 
appears that duties in addition to U.C.C. duties exist on the part of a Defendant); Weinberg, Lisa G., Letter of 
Credit Litigation: Bank Liability for Punitive Damages, 54 Fordham L. Rev. 905, 911 n.31 (1986) (Asserting that 
common law applies unless displaced by Code, noting U.C.C. § 1-103 (1977) states that “[u]nless displaced by the 
particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law and equity . . . shall supplement its provisions”).  For a 
general discussion as to how sales of goods are distinguished from sales of services, see Gimeno, Christine, et. al., 
79 C.J.S. Secured Transactions §2. 
90 Weigand, Tory, The Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Commercial Contracts in Massachusetts, 88 Mass. L. Rev. 
174 (2004).  For a description of the English view toward good faith, see Judge Brimham LJ in Interfoto Picture 
Library Ltd. v. Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd. [1988] 2 W.L.R. 615 (“English law has, characteristically, committed 
itself to no such overriding principle [as the principle of good faith] but has developed piecemeal solutions in 
response to demonstrated problems of unfairness…”) cited in Moss, Giuditta Cordero, International Contracts 
between Common Law and Civil Law: Is Non-state Law to Be Preferred? The Difficulty of Interpreting Legal Standards Such 
as Good Faith, 7 Global Jurist (Advances) 9 (2007).   
91 Weigand, Tory, The Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Commercial Contracts in Massachusetts, 88 Mass. L. Rev. 
174-175 (2004) citing to N. Heel Corp. v. Comp. Indus., 851 F.2d 456, 466 (1st Cir. 1988). 
92 See id. at 174, 176, citing to Essex Trust Co. v. Enwright, 214 Mass. 507 (1913); Foss v. Roby, 195 Mass. 292, 298 
(1907). 
93 See Levenson v. Feuer, 60 Mass. App. Ct. 428, 437-438 (2004) (conveyance instrument which would assist real 
estate contracting parties seeking to dodge statutes concerning government foreclosure process was voided); Beacon 
Hill Civic Ass’n v. Ristorante Toscano, Inc., 422 Mass. 318, 320 (1996), quoting Farnsworth, E. Allan, Contracts, 5.1 at 
345 (1990) (“the public interest [is] to accord individuals broad powers to order their affairs through legally 
enforceable agreements”).   
94 Weigand, Tory, The Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Commercial Contracts in Massachusetts, 88 Mass. L. Rev. 
174, 177 (2004); see also Shoe & Leather Nat’l Bank v. Dix, 123 Mass. 148, 150 (1877) (Where contracts inoperative 
under their “true meaning,” the courts cannot “suppose a meaning which the parties have not expressed”); PDC-El 
Paso Meridien, LLC v. Alstrom Power, 18 Mass. L. Reptr. 14 (2004) (no page numbers available online) (Absent 
“special circumstances,” court held that “[i]t is not the role of the court to alter the parties’ agreement”). 
95 Weigand, Tory, The Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Commercial Contracts in Massachusetts, 88 Mass. L. Rev. 
174, 188 (2004).  Note that freedom of contract theory is influential in the development of common contract law.  
The theory focuses on leaving the contracting parties to their own agreement, recognizing that contracting parties 
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holding that such duties will not be used to “rewrite the parties’ agreement.”96  Courts refuse to 
“accomplish by judicial fiat what [a party] neglected to achieve contractually.”97  Commercial 
parties will be held to their chosen language and the relationship embodied in the contract.  
Courts will thus not “attempt to rewrite the parties’ contract to conform to the court’s sense of 
equity or preference for a different outcome, no matter how appealing.”98  For example, in the 
Massachusetts case Owen v. Kessler, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 466 (2002), a real estate commitment 
outlined a specific timeframe as to when an executed purchase and sale agreement must be 
provided.  When the buyer delivered the agreement late, less than half an hour later than the 
agreed time, the seller refused to sell the property.99  The Appellate Court rejected the buyer’s 
claim of a violation of the good faith and fair dealing duty, finding any such duty could not 
override an express contractual term.100  A U.S. court has also flatly rejected a good faith duty 
even when a preliminary agreement expressly stated or inferred such obligation, holding that 
“[a]n agreement to negotiate in good faith is amorphous and nebulous, since it implicates so 
many factors that are themselves indefinite and uncertain that the intent of the parties can only 
be fathomed by conjecture and surmise.”101   
Good faith interpretation ensuring a core civilian contracting value, a reasonable dispute 
outcome, is less exalted in the common law systems.  The common law focuses often on 
contractual freedom, a contract’s literal meaning, the individual contracting parties’ autonomy 
and expected judicial recognition of the contracting parties’ relationship—even when a contract 
may yield “unfair” results.102  For example, English courts are reluctant to impose additional 
 
are free to enter into mutually beneficial economic exchanges.  See DiMatteo, Larry A., Theory of Efficient Penalty: 
Eliminating the Law of Liquidated Damages, 38 Am. Bus. L. J. 633, 641 (2001) (“The freedom of parties to structure 
their own agreement is universally acknowledged to be at the heart of the common law of contracts”).   
96 See Weigand, Tory, The Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Commercial Contracts in Massachusetts, 88 Mass. L. 
Rev. 174 at 188 n. 182 (2004) citing to Chokel v. Genzyme Corp., 2003 Mass. Super. LEXIS 417 (Nov. 12, 2003) (Van 
Gestel, J.) (“New or independent duties separate from those already in contract cannot be added by a judge under 
the cloak of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing”); Kroutik v. Momentix, Inc., 2003 Mass. Super. 
LEXIS 112 (Apr. 2, 2003); Owen v. Kessler, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 466 (2002) (same). 
97 Northern Heel Corp. v. Compo Indus., Inc., 851 F.2d 456, 466 (1st Cir. 1988); Mathewson Corp. v. Allied Marine 
Indus., Inc., 827 F.2d 850, 855 (1st Cir. 1987) (Court held it is “[f]ar wiser for a court to honor the parties’ words 
than to imply other and further  promises out of thin air”).  
98 Weigand, Tory, The Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Commercial Contracts in Massachusetts, 88 Mass. L. Rev. 
174, 188 n. 184 (2004) citing to Epstein, Becker & Green, P.C. v. Atlas Venture, 2003 Mass.Super. LEXIS 84, 10 
(2003); Rogaris v. Albert, 431 Mass. 833, 835 (2000). 
99 Owen v. Kessler, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 467-469 (2002).   
100 See id. at 471-472. see also Bryant v. Nickerson, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 1118 (2006) (no page numbers available online) 
(Prospective real estate buyer failed to provide notice of inability to obtain financing at date designated in purchase 
agreement; seller awarded liquidated damages contemplated under the agreement). 
101 Candid Prods., Inc. v. Int’l Skating Union, 530 F. Supp. 1330, 1337 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); see also Metromedia 
Broadcasting Corp. v. MGM/UA Entertainment Co., Inc., 611 F. Supp. 415 (D.C. Cal 1985). 
102 De Ly, Filip, Commercial Law as a Refuge from Contract Law: A Comparative and Uniform Law Perspective, 45 Wayne 
L. Rev. 1825, 1852 (2000); Moss, Giuditta Cordero, International Contracts between Common Law and Civil Law: Is 
Non-state Law to Be Preferred? The Difficulty of Interpreting Legal Standards Such as Good Faith, 7 Global Jurist 
(Advances) 4 (2007).   
  
Nordic Journal of Commercial Law 
Issue 2012#1 
17 
contract terms, and, in but few examples (such as the doctrine of frustration) will not revise 
contracts in the instance of changed circumstances which make it more difficult for a contracting 
party to perform.103  Moreover, English contract law does not interpret contracts by examining 
party intent, but focuses on what the contracting parties have “expressed and written down.”104  
“English judges do not openly interfere with contract terms in order to supplement, correct, or 
revise them. The basic attitude is much more pragmatic; contracts work most efficiently if the 
parties stick to what they have expressed, without judges interfering to speculate about their 
intentions and to depart from the terms of the commercial deal and negotiation power.”105  
Under the common law, as contracting parties will be held to their bargain, and courts will not 
interpret a contract outside the agreement’s expressed meaning.106  Extrinsic contract 
circumstances, such as conduct during, before, or after contract execution, are generally not 
considered by the judge.107  Thus, in order to ensure commercial predictability, the common law 
parol evidence rule disallows parties producing evidence which may vary, add or contradict a 
contract’s wording.108  But note that the parol evidence rule has a series of exceptions that admit 
evidence of the factual background existing at or before the date of the contract (but not after 
that date, as opposed to the civilian systems), at least in respect of facts that were known to both 
parties.109 
The Anglo-American legal tradition’s maintenance of an approach more formalistic than the civil 
law system is also demonstrated when comparing contract formation requirements.  The 
Norwegian tradition, for example, finds that oral agreements are valid and binding.110  Compare 
this with the American approach, involving the Statute of Frauds.  Under the Statute, certain 
 
103 De Ly, Filip, Commercial Law as a Refuge from Contract Law: A Comparative and Uniform Law Perspective, 45 Wayne 
L. Rev. 1825, 1852 (2000).  A commentator proposes that U.K. courts are unlikely to inordinately intervene with 
commercial dealings, which “interruptions” will be damaging for business dealings and comprises predictability.  
Miller, Lucinda, Penalty Clauses in England and France: A Comparative Study, 53 ICLQ 79, 90 (2004).   
104 De Ly, Filip, Commercial Law as a Refuge from Contract Law: A Comparative and Uniform Law Perspective, 45 Wayne 
L. Rev. 1825, 1852 (2000). 
105 DiMatteo, Larry A., An International Contract Law Formula: The Informality of International Business Transactions 
Plus the Internationalization of Contract Law Equals Unexpected Contractual Liability, 23 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 67 
(1997); see also Moss, Giuditta Cordero, International Contracts between Common Law and Civil Law: Is Non-state Law 
to Be Preferred? The Difficulty of Interpreting Legal Standards Such as Good Faith, 7 Global Jurist (Advances) 4 (2007) 
(the common law judge’s central role enforcing what the parties agreed through their bargain, rather than creating 
justice).   
106 Weigand, Tory, The Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Commercial Contracts in Massachusetts, 88 Mass. L. Rev. 
174, 188 n. 184 (2004).   
107 Moss, Giuditta Cordero, International Contracts between Common Law and Civil Law: Is Non-state Law to Be 
Preferred? The Difficulty of Interpreting Legal Standards Such as Good Faith, 7 Global Jurist (Advances) 5 (2007).  In 
repeated caselaw, American courts underscore that interpretation is bound to the “four corners” of the contract. 
108 See id. at 5 n.7.   
109 See id. at 6.  For a description of various American parol evidence rule exceptions, including contractual 
negotiations, see Glasser, Mark K. and Keith A. Rowley, On Parol: The Construction and Interpretation of Written 
Agreements and the Role of Extrinsic Evidence in Contract Litigation, 49 Baylor L. Rev. 657, 705-711 (1997). 
110 Gustafsson, Leif, Business Laws in the Nordic Countries: Legal and Tax Aspects 392 (1998).   
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contracts are deemed unenforceable unless the agreements are in writing and executed by the 
person bound under the contract’s terms.  Although formalized requirements vary from state to 
state, particular industry or trade-specific agreements are bound under the Statute’s 
requirements. Typical contracts requiring the Statute include those: (i) involving real property 
interests, (ii) sureties, (iii) agreements for the sale/lease of goods at $500 or more, (iv) certain 
non-competition agreements, (v) separation agreements and (vi) made by or on behalf of a 
municipality.111  
Contractual intent is thus also a means of contrasting the common and civil law traditions.  For 
example, the common law legal system holds that business communications with uncertain 
contractual intent are presumed unenforceable.112  Under the traditional common law view, all 
enforceable commercial contracts maintained a proof of a clear intent to enter a legal 
relationship, and certainty as to all material contract terms.113  Conversely, civilian countries do 
not demand contract relations as a prerequisite to contract enforceability, as in the common 
law.114  Accordingly, as compared to the common law jurisdictions, civil law countries tend to 
find contractual parties legally bound “at an earlier stage of the negotiation process.”115 
The common law approach in the U.S. thus places great weight (and responsibility) on the 
parties, as effected through their contractual arrangement.116  Exercising judicial interpretation 
based upon good faith violations is exceedingly rare.  Unambiguous contracts are to be 
construed by courts within the agreements’ “plain terms” or “four corners,” where introducing 
any extrinsic evidence in contract disputes that contradict or supplement the agreement’s 
express terms were forbidden.117  Alternatively, civil law courts attempt to avoid unjust 
 
111 Brinkley, Martin H., The Regulation of Contractual Change: A Guide to No Oral Modification Clauses for North 
Carolina Lawyers, 81 N.C. L. Rev. 2239 (2003). 
112 DiMatteo, Larry A., An International Contract Law Formula: The Informality of International Business Transactions 
Plus the Internationalization of Contract Law Equals Unexpected Contractual Liability, 23 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 67, 
69 (1997). 
113 See id.  
114 See id. at 67, 70.   
115 DiMatteo, Larry A., An International Contract Law Formula: The Informality of International Business Transactions 
Plus the Internationalization of Contract Law Equals Unexpected Contractual Liability, 23 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 67, 
70 (1997) citing to Klein, John & Carla Bachechi, Precontractual Liability and the Duty of Good Faith Negotiation in 
International Transactions, 17 Hous. J. Int’l L. 1, 17 (1994). 
116 Publishers Resource Inc., v. Walker-Davis Publications, Inc., 762 F.2d 557 (7th Cir. 1985), citing to Stein v. Malden 
Mills, Inc., 9 Ill. App. 3rd 266, 270-271 (1972) (“Obviously the terms of the contract control, and it is not our [the 
court’s] function to rewrite them according to our own notions of fairness”); Dresser Indus. v. Pyrrhus AG, 936 F.2d 
921, 933 (7th Cir. 1991); Scheduling Corp. of America v. Massello, 503 N.E.2d 806, 811 (1987). 
117 Weigand, Tory, The Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Commercial Contracts in Massachusetts, 88 Mass. L. Rev. 
174, 177 (2004); see also Shoe & Leather Nat’l Bank v. Dix, 123 Mass. 148, 150 (1877) (Where contracts inoperative 
under their “true meaning,” the courts cannot “suppose a meaning which the parties have not expressed”); PDC-El 
Paso Meridien, LLC v. Alstrom Power, 18 Mass. L. Reptr. 14 (2004) (no page numbers available online) (Absent 
“special circumstances,” court held that “[i]t is not the role of the court to alter the parties’ agreement”). 
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solutions stemming from a contract’s literal interpretation.118  Such is the divergence between a 
civilian good faith approach and a common law interpretation of contractual relations. 
3 Exploring Law-in-Action: Objective Pluralism Considerations 
Reviewing the comparative commercial civil and common law precepts of good faith 
demonstrates that key legal concepts may be interpreted differently across legal families.  
Exploring the black letter law of good faith reveals divergences. In order to ascertain how the 
law acts in practice, an additional dimension to a theoretical textbook framework is, however, 
needed. Thus, a law-in-action approach is demanded.  In addition to ascertaining the strengths 
and weaknesses of one’s own legal regime, reviewing an international business law legal 
standard presents practical implications.  Namely, business parties are presented with 
opportunities to evaluate legal equivalency—decision-makers are informed on the implications 
of pursuing multi-jurisdictional transactions.  Yet, the challenge remains to find evaluative, 
objective measures which complement a traditional black letter law review.119  Such is objective 
pluralism, which analyzes a comparative legal problem from economic, social, behavioral and, as 
applicable, relational contracting law perspectives.  The totality of such review produces 
balanced insights, using a multiplicity of factors—precluding the dangers of approaching a 
problem with the mislaid goal of a “one-size-fits-all” perspective.120 
3.1 The Economic Method: Transaction Costs, Efficiency 
Economic analysis allows the evaluation of business law in divergent legal systems, necessitating 
the consideration of several interlinked factors, including transaction costs, risk allocation and 
economic utility.  Despite criticism, such analysis offers comparativists insights and modes of 
comparison otherwise unavailable when distinguishing law under purely sociological 
mechanisms. When analyzing legal concepts under different legal regimes, economics can 
ultimately create efficient models “which work as homogeneous grounds of comparison.”121 
Economic analysis increases outcome prediction success rates,122  while avoiding value 
 
118 Moss, Giuditta Cordero, International Contracts between Common Law and Civil Law: Is Non-state Law to Be 
Preferred? The Difficulty of Interpreting Legal Standards Such as Good Faith, 7 Global Jurist (Advances) 1 (2007).   
119 Karl N. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush 12 (2nd ed. 1951) (“[R]ules alone, mere forms of words, are worthless”) cited 
in Halperin, Jean-Louis, Law in the Books and Law in Action: The Problem of Legal Change, 64 Me. L. Rev. 45, 
52 (2011). 
120 Palmer, Vernon Valentine, From Lerotholi to Lando: Some Examples of Comparative Law Methodology, 53 Am. J. 
Comp. L. 261, 264 (2005) (“Reaching the “law in action” is still a scientific ideal of mainstream comparative law, 
but one is never quite sure how high the cognitive bar has been set”). 
121 See Mattei, Ugo, Comparative Law and Economics 94-95 (1997).   
122 Ogus, Anthony, What Legal Scholars can Learn from Law and Economics, 79 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 393 (2004). see also 
Friedman, Milton, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in Essays in Positive Economics 3, 14-16 (1953) 
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judgments generally associated with sociological studies which often seek to determine what 
composes fair law and policy.123  Economics also predicts what economic consequences flow 
from the differences among legal systems.124 
Several issues emerge when employing an economic analysis of comparative law.  It has been 
argued that three key elements characterize modern law and economic theory: (i) people 
“maximize,” in that they try to reduce costs and increase benefits, (ii) markets reconcile 
individual wants with the limited resources available and (iii) more efficient markets and laws 
have the potential to make people “better off.”125  Looking deeper at legal economic theory,126 
significant scholarship has been dedicated to studying how transactional parties contend with 
internal and external costs—all within the context of economic efficiency.  Utilizing the economic 
evaluative method mandates focus on two distinct areas: economic efficiency and transaction 
costs, which often intersect. 
3.1.1 Understanding Efficiency 
“Efficiency” is defined in economic terms as acting with a minimum of effort, waste and 
expense.127  In the contracting context, agreements are viewed as efficient means of wealth 
maximization.128  Efficiency, when voiced in the context of international legal transactions from a 
contracting standpoint,  involves the costs of instituting required legal mechanisms—all while 
 
(unimportant that economic reasoning is based on assumptions that do not reflect the “real world” so long as 
those assumptions produce “predictable” results).  
123 Posner, Richard A. and Anthony T. Kronman, The Economics of Contract Law 1-5 (1979). 
124 Ogus, Anthony, What Legal Scholars can Learn from Law and Economics, 79 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 393 (2004) (Under  
rubric of French and English law, economics provides evaluation of differences between national legal principles 
governing identical factual situations) 
125 Baird, Douglas G., The Future of Law and Economics: Looking Forward, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1129, 1164 (1997). 
126 Law and economics, at least with respect to the so-called “Chicago School” of economics, has been defined as 
sharing certain familiar characteristics, including “reliance on the neo-classical assumption that individuals are 
rational maximizers; equating change in legal rules with change in relative prices; and adoption of Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency (“potential Pareto efficiency,” in more obscure terms) in the sense of wealth maximization as a standard 
of evaluation.” Harris, Ron, The Uses of History in Law and Economics, 4 Theoretical Inquiries L. 659, 666-667 
(2003).  
127 Malloy, Robin Paul, Law and Economics: A Comparative Approach to Theory and Practice 38 (1990).   
128 Dimatteo, Larry A., Theory of Efficient Penalty: Eliminating the Law of Liquidated Damages, 38 Am. Bus. L. J. 633, 
642 (2001); Brizzee, David, Note, Liquidated Damages and the Penalty Rule: A Reassessment, 1991 BYU L. Rev. 1613, 
1615.  
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weighing the necessary autonomy of contracting parties.129  This creates tensions, which 
economists urge should be considered in terms of overall transaction costs.130 
Note that reviewing comparative business law regimes under an efficiency prism must 
overcome hurdles.  For example, how is efficiency effectively (if not singularly) measured, 
particularly within the contractual law context?  Economists measure efficiency differently, most 
notably through Pareto superior and Kaldor-Hicks models.  If an economic transaction is “Pareto 
superior,” the contractual breaching party would be in a more favorable economic position 
following breach, while the non-breaching party would not be in a worse position.131  Pareto 
efficiency thus occurs if no superior points are available, meaning that it is impossible to “make 
any individual better off without making someone else worse off.”132  The classic example is a 
voluntary market exchange where, in the absence of factors such as fraud or duress, both parties 
are bettered by the exchange.  Each party valued the other bargained object “more than which 
they were originally holding, or else they would not have made the exchange…[and it is thus] 
ascertainable as to how great transaction costs may prevent otherwise efficient exchanges”133  
Pareto analysis therefore “allows economists to identify improvements without assessing 
relative values of these improvements to parties.” 134 
Under the Kaldor-Hicks standard, an economic action is efficient if a new outcome allows the 
benefiting party to be “sufficiently better off,” receiving a utility increase, even if the contractual 
 
129 A legal economist argues that drafting “efficient” contract terms may be prohibitively costly, particularly as 
negotiating clear language may be overly time-consuming to, or both parties will lack essential information 
necessary for drafting such clauses. Charny, David, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 
373, 436 (1990).   
130 “The difficulty of balancing various dimensions of efficiency in heterogeneous circumstances suggests two 
general institutional responses: choosing legal default rules that are second best, and permitting freedom of 
contract so that individual parties can use their local knowledge to improve on the general defaults that public 
lawmakers have set. For example, if we think that private bargaining is relatively costly due to bilateral monopoly or 
other transaction costs, we should choose default rules to implement the tradeoff that best suits majority 
preference; conversely, if we think that private bargaining is relatively cheap, we should select default rules that 
encourage such bargaining.” Goetz, Charles J. and Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the 
Interactions between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 261 (1985) cited in Katz, Avery W., Remedies 
for Breach of Contract under the CISG, 25 Int’l Rev. of L. and Econ. 382 (2005). 
131 Coleman, Jules, Markets, Morals, and the Law 97 (1988); Dodge, William S., The Case for Punitive Damages in 
Contracts, 48 Duke L. J. 629, 652 n.132 (1999) (Pareto efficient transactions result in a net increase in wealth, 
without anyone in a worsened condition as a result of the transaction; the contract gainers compensate losers for 
any losses caused by the transaction); see also Cooter, Robert & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 41-42 (1997) 
(discussing Pareto efficient transactions and the Kaldor-Hicks standard); Malloy, Robin Paul, Law and Economics: 
A Comparative Approach to Theory and Practice 39 (1990) (Pareto superiority refers to a status quo change where 
at least one person is made better off without making anyone else worse off).  For an additional “textbook” analysis 
of  Pareto theory, see McLure, Michael, Pareto, Economics and Society (Routledge, 2008). 
132 Malloy, Robin Paul, Law and Economics: A Comparative Approach to Theory and Practice 39. 
133 See id. at 40.  
134 Cender, Joshua, Knocking Opportunism: A Reexamination of Efficient Breach of Contract, 1995 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 
689, 697 (1996); see also Posner, Richard A., Economic Analysis of Law 13 (1992). 
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“losers” would be compensated:135 the efficiency of an action may be weighed if an alternative 
policy, condition, or program is “better.”136  The Kaldor-Hicks theory therefore focuses on 
whether society’s aggregate utility is maximized, and not whether resource allocation will make 
certain parties worse off.137  Within a contractual context, efficiency may also look to the 
duration of  an agreement and the relationship between the parties.138  In short, resource 
reallocation is efficient if those gaining from it obtain enough to compensate for those who lose 
from it, although no requirement exists that actual compensation occurs.139  The Kaldor-Hicks 
theory therefore focuses on whether society’s aggregate utility is maximized, and not whether 
resource allocation will make certain parties worse off.140  Distinguishing between Kaldor-Hicks 
and Pareto superior models of efficiency thus involves, in the former instance, a social utility 
dimension.  
A hypothetical case demonstrates the tensions between both efficiency theories under a legal 
setting.141  For example, a commercial landlord’s office building may be targeted by municipal 
authorities for use in its redevelopment plans.  A developer asserts that a major project at the 
site will rejuvenate the city, and provide the municipality with twice the fair market value which 
the city offers the landlord.  The landlord resists the offer, instead preferring to remain 
operational.  It would not be a Pareto superior state if the municipality opts to pay the fair 
market value, given the landlord’s objections to sell, and its decreased utility following the 
conveyance.  The Kaldor-Hicks test would find an efficient transaction, assuming that the 
 
135 Sidhu, Dawinder, The Immorality and Inefficiency of an Efficient Breach, 8 Tenn. J. Bus. L. 61, 65 (2006) citing to 
Coleman, Jules, Markets, Morals, and the Law 98 (1988); Linzer, Peter, On the Amorality of Contract Remedies--
Efficiency, Equity, and the Second Restatement, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 111, 114. (1981) (“Society’s welfare increases 
through a benefit to one individual, even as loss also passes to another party, to the extent that the benefited party 
may fully compensate the “losing party,” and “remain better,” than before. If the breaching party is not required to 
compensate the nonbreaching party, the breach is Kaldor-Hicks efficient”);  Dodge, William S., The Case for 
Punitive Damages in Contracts, 48 Duke L. J. 629, 652 n.132 (1999) ( “a transaction is Kaldor-Hicks efficient if the 
gainers gain more than the losers lose”); Posner, Richard A., The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in 
Common Law Adjudication, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 487, 491 (1980); Posner, Richard A., The Problems of Jurisprudence 
19 (1990) (Wealth maximization standard only requires that “the winners’ gains exceed the losers’ losses”); Posner, 
Richard A., Economic Analysis of Law 13-16 (1992) (Kaldor-Hicks involves wealth maximization state, where a 
more superior state exists when more wealth is generated); Katz, Steven B., The California Tort of Bad Faith Breach, 
the Dissent in Seaman’s v. Standard Oil, and the Role of Punitive Damages in Contract Doctrine, 60 S. Cal. L. Rev. 509, 
521-28 (1987). But see Cender, Joshua, Knocking Opportunism: A Reexamination of Efficient Breach of Contract, 1995 
Ann. Surv. Am. L. 689, 697 n.59 (1996) (Kaldor-Hicks theory is limited as it ignores wealth distribution; unlike 
Pareto model, as long as one party’s gain is higher than another party’s loss, Kaldor-Hicks superior state realized).  
For an additional “textbook” analysis, see Varian, Hal R., Intermediate Microeconomics (W.W. Norton & Co., 6th 
ed. 2006) at 15-16. 
136 Schelling, Thomas C., Economic Reasoning and the Ethics of Policy, 63 The Public Interest, 37, 50 (1981).  
137 See id.  
138 Schelling, Thomas C., Economic Reasoning and the Ethics of Policy, 63 The Public Interest, 37, 50 (1981).  
139 Malloy, Robin Paul, Law and Economics: A Comparative Approach to Theory and Practice 40 (1990).   
140 See id.  
141 The illustration is based on an example found in Malloy, Robin Paul, Law and Economics: A Comparative 
Approach to Theory and Practice 41-42 (1990). 
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municipality’s increase in value (considering that the pay-out of fair market value to the 
commercial landlord is sufficient, and that the community will reap reward from the developer 
in this beneficial redevelopment project) will result in a total social utility increase, even if the 
landlord is somehow worsened by the transaction.142  
3.1.2 Transaction Costs 
Transaction costs drain the efficiencies flowing from contractual provisions and are associated 
with all aspects of such clauses, from negotiation to implementation.  While transaction costs 
have many definitions and interpretations, they are generally understood in the commercial 
contracting context as those costs incurred during the actual contractual negotiations, given that 
parties remain possibly uncertain as to whether other contracting partners shall honor their 
contractual commitments, or breach.143  Acquisition of information is a necessary, central 
transaction cost.144  Nevertheless, transaction costs may have alternate meanings in different 
legal systems, and cultures---the depth of what such topic covers may also be unwieldy in scope.  
The breaching contracting party’s reputational loss is another cost, as parties would hesitate to 
enter into contracts with “deliberate breachers,” or parties prone to breaching; if they do, 
onerous contractual terms to deter a breach would likely be required.145  Transaction costs also 
include expenses associated from dealing with the breach, including dispute resolution costs, 
finding alternative suppliers, and entering into new agreements.146  The transaction costs may 
vary in international settings, where, for example, disputing costs and monitoring costs are 
higher, given the unfamiliarity with the forum involved and local legal requirements.147   
With respect to drafting, note that commercially-incomplete contracts are quite expensive to 
create, given that drafting parties may seek to withhold information needed to complete the 
agreement.  The parties may also purposefully leave the contract incomplete (missing significant 
contractual terms), hoping to agree on certain terms at a later date.148  Contracts, particularly 
those encompassing international transactions, necessitate a multiplicity of jurisdiction-specific 
rules and further require specific drafting in order to not only provide parties their desired 
 
142 Malloy, recognizing this social dimension, thus holds that “a Kaldor-Hicks test permits moves where a Pareto 
superior test does not.” Malloy, Robin Paul, Law and Economics: A Comparative Approach to Theory and Practice 
41-42 (1990).   
143 Sidhu, Dawinder, The Immorality and Inefficiency of an Efficient Breach, 8 Tenn. J. Bus. L. 61, 89 (2006).   
144 Georgakopoulos, Nicholas L., Principles and Methods of Law and Economics: Basic Tools for Normative 
Reasoning 246 (2005) (Noting that buyers entering into transactions after precisely researching the exact benefits 
never into disadvantageous acquisitions.  “If at time of contracting the buyer’s benefits are imprecise, then by 
entering into the contract the buyer takes some risk”). 
145 Sidhu, Dawinder, The Immorality and Inefficiency of an Efficient Breach, 8 Tenn. J. Bus. L. 61, 89 (2006).   
146 See id.   
147 Katz, Avery W., Remedies for Breach of Contract under the CISG, 25 Int’l Rev. of L. and Econ. 383 (2005). 
148 Baker, Scott and Kimberly D. Krawiec, Incomplete Contracts in a Complete Contract World, 33 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 
725, 726 (2006).   
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confidence, but also to be sufficiently clear for judicial enforcement.149  Common law parties, in 
particular, will likely strive for an exact document which provides mechanisms revealing, for 
example, how to comply with the terms of the bargain, setting out the procedures should breach 
occur, and whether, if not how, to sue.  Form commercial documents may also add transaction 
cost pressures, given that revisions to standard forms, due to unique situations, could escalate 
the contract drafting expenses.150  Finally, parties seeking background knowledge of the local 
rules in international contracting may increase contract negotiating and drafting costs.151  
3.1.3 Criticism of Economic Analysis 
Critics challenge the usefulness and merit of economics as a comparative analytical tool.  First, 
economics offer “hazy” definitions of efficiency, which proponents confess have no clear 
definitional parameters.152  Critics present that a pure economics analysis disregards the 
unending complexities of human behavior, and that neoclassical economic analysis narrowly 
(and incorrectly) presupposes that maximizing welfare, measured by wealth increase, 
dominates societal decisions.153  Definitions, including pure economic loss, also vary among legal 
systems.154  Some economists presuppose that a comparative legal approach must “refrain from 
 
149 Charny, David, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 373, 403 (1990). see also Hirsch, 
Werner Z., Law and Economics: An Introductory Analysis 148 (1988) (Transaction costs include the costs of 
negotiating, preparing and signing a contract) 
150 Hirsch notes that, at least within a consumer sense, non-negotiated boilerplate contracts may reduce transaction 
costs, avoiding the need for drafting new contracts (assuming no negotiation is involved).  Hirsch, Werner Z., Law 
and Economics: An Introductory Analysis 154 (1988). 
151 Gilson, Ronald J., Value Creation by Business Lawyers, 94 Yale L. J. 239 (1984). 
152 Mattei, Ugo, Comparative Law and Economics 145 (1997); Rogers, Catherine A., Gulliver's Troubled Travels, or The 
Conundrum of Comparative Law, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 149, 185 (1998).  Supporters rebut such presumption 
noting that economic legal theory, including a flexible definition of efficiency, is particularly relevant in 
comparative law insofar that comparison allows academics to discern which rule or institution possesses lower 
transaction costs and greater market acceptance. See, generally, Mattei, Ugo, Comparative Law and Economics 145 
(1997). 
153 Hillman, Robert, The Limits of Behavioral Decision Theory in Legal Analysis: The Case of Liquidated Damages, 85 
Cornell L. Rev. 717 (2000).  Under the neoclassic view, a free market’s voluntary exchange occurs as parties value 
what is received more than what is lost. See id.  As such exchange moves resources to “higher valued uses,” 
allocative efficiency is increased. Farnsworth, E. Allan, Contracts 762 (1999). see also Posner, Eric A., A Theory of 
Contract Law under Conditions of Radical Judicial Error, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 749 (2000) (Neoclassical model refers to 
contracts understood as “discrete, one-shot exchanges”); Posner, Richard A., Economic Analysis of Law 10-11 
(1992) (Efficiency occurs when resources used when their value is highest, and people thus benefit society as they 
pursue self-interest); Hillman, Robert, The Limits of Behavioral Decision Theory in Legal Analysis: The Case of Liquidated 
Damages, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 717, 726 (2000);  H.M.O. Sys., Inc. v. Choicecare Health Servs., Inc., 665 P.2d 635, 639 
(Colo. Ct. App. 1983); Rogers, Catherine A., Gulliver's Troubled Travels, or The Conundrum of Comparative Law, 67 
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 149, 185 (1998), citing to Becker, Gary S., The Economic Approach to Human Behavior 14 
(1976).   
154 See Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe and Hans-Bernd Schäfer, The Core of Pure Economic Loss, 27 Int’l Rev. of Law and 
Econ. 8, 12 (2007) citing to Bussani, Mauro, Pure Economic Loss in Europe at 4 (2003).  Pure economic loss is 
outlined in law and economics theory.   
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attempting a conceptual definition” of pure economic-loss.155  Economists also necessarily use 
several noteworthy, and often contested, assumptions in the law and economics framework, 
including: (i) individuals may access a reasonable information flow, (ii) individuals know their 
own wants and needs, which understanding may not be shared by a third party, (iii) people 
understand market signals, (iv) the market disregards fairness or justice issues—and thus 
individuals should not be offended by market functions, (v) market competition, involving 
multiple actors, is assumed, (vi) people and resources are freely transferable and (vii) an 
existing distribution of income and resources is accepted.156  Criticism is raised when individuals 
are considered to act as rational utility maximizers, a key element of the law and economics 
movement.157  A legal theorist contends that individuals frequently deviate from “rational 
norms” in their decision-making process.158 Comparative legal systems have different methods 
of evaluating the strength of business law precepts.  While aspects of economic analysis of 
comparative law problems add crucial insights, such analysis alone also presents questions and 
concerns. 
3.2 Sociology as an Objective Method: Behavioral Theory 
Sociological studies, while allowing empirical data to be collected in comparative legal reviews, 
face many criticisms from legal scholars, primarily those attacking the limited ability to involve 
neutral evaluative standards.  One proposed example of a sociological methodology is behavioral 
theory.  The relative inflexibility of that comparative method, however, renders its usefulness as 
questionable.   
Behavioral theory, asserting that individuals act irrationally, serves as a challenge to the legal 
economists’ view of the “global rationality of man.”159  The theory’s goal is the attainment of a 
modeling which determines how individuals react to inconsistent legal rules and regimes, with 
the expectation that the results of such reactions lead to predicting individual responses, with 
 
155 Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe and Hans-Bernd Schäfer, The Core of Pure Economic Loss, 27 Int’l Rev. of Law and 
Econ. 8, 12 (2007). Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe and Hans-Bernd Schäfer, The Core of Pure Economic Loss: Working 
Paper, Amsterdam Center for Law and Economics Working Paper No. 2005-003 (2005) (Abstract), at 
http://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/publications/working_papers/05-22.pdf (no page numbers available online) 
(“The established law and economics wisdom considers pure economic loss as a transfer of wealth from the victim 
to a third party, whose earnings increase as a consequence of the accident.  Such transfers do not amount to a 
social loss and, hence, should not be compensated”). 
156 Malloy, Robin Paul, Law and Economics: A Comparative Approach to Theory and Practice 33 (1990).   
157 Prentice, Robert A., Chicago Man, K-T Man, and the Future of Behavioral Law and Economics, 56 Vand. L. Rev. 
1663 (2003).   
158 Id. at 1667.  The Chicago School’s assumption of individual goals for wealth maximization has been suggested 
to allow “no room for cognitive limitations, emotion, or altruism, [describing] neither how man does act nor how 
man should act.” Id. at 1672. 
159 See Simon, Herbert A., A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Quarterly J. Econ. 99 (1955). 
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certainty.160  Within a comparative contractual analysis, behavioral legal theory introduced the 
concept that the non-breaching party’s loss of contractual rights at breach is an entitlement 
loss.161  As such, the non-breaching party ultimately values the loss greater than any gain, even if 
common law compensatory damages adequately compensated the monetary loss. 162   
Behavioral law theory attacks pure economic-guided legal review, challenging the central legal 
economist assumption that individuals behave rationally, at least as far as an individual’s pursuit 
of wealth maximization.163  Behavioral theorist opponents debunk the reasoning that actors 
always behave irrationally.164  An economic theorist challenges such assumption, concluding 
that uniform, cross-cultural irrationality is not a given: 
“[D]ifferences in education, training, cognitive capacity, thinking dispositions, sex, and 
cultural background across individuals appear to be reliably associated with different 
levels of cognitive performance. Furthermore, emotional differences, developmental 
differences, and different modes of mental processing appear to be associated with 
different levels of cognitive performance within individuals.  Therefore, depending on 
the characteristics of the individual and the system of thought activated in a particular 
decision making situation, the behavior of different groups of individuals and the 
behavior of the same individual may vary considerably, from perfect rationality to 
seeming irrationality.”165 
Many legal theorists doubt behavioral theorist propositions that individuals consistently act 
irrationally, and the assertion that “departures from rationality are sufficiently systematic to be 
useful in making legal policy.”166  Proposing legal “trends” of irrationality is, by definition, 
inconsistent, and whether behavior theory offers a means to adjudge the competence or validity 
 
160 Rostain, Tanina, Educating Homo Economicus: Cautionary Notes on the New Behavior And Law and Economics 
Movement, 34 Law & Soc’y Rev. 973, 983 (2000). 
161 Dimatteo, Larry A., Theory of Efficient Penalty: Eliminating the Law of Liquidated Damages, 38 Am. Bus. L. J. 633, 
704 (2001) citing to Sunstein, Cass R., Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175 (1997); see also Pouncy, 
Charles R.P., The Rational Rogue: Neoclassical Economic Ideology in the Regulation of the Financial Profession, 26 Vt. L. 
Rev. 263, 264 (2002) (“Economic rationality as it is currently deployed is a grossly inadequate approximation of 
the factors motivating human conduct”). 
162 Dimatteo, Larry A., Theory of Efficient Penalty: Eliminating the Law of Liquidated Damages, 38 Am. Bus. L. J. 633, 
704 (2001) citing to Sunstein, Cass R., Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175 (1997). 
163 Prentice, Robert A., Chicago Man, K-T Man, and the Future of Behavioral Law and Economics, 56 Vand. L. Rev. 
1663, 1722 (2003).   
164 See Mitchell, Gregory, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New Behavioral Analysis 
of Law, 43 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1907 (2002); Mitchell, Gregory, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should 
not be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 Geo. L. J. 67 (2002). 
165 Mitchell, Gregory, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and 
Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 Geo. L. J. 67, 87 (2002). 
166 Prentice, Robert A., Chicago Man, K-T Man, and the Future of Behavioral Law and Economics, 56 Vand. L. Rev. 
1663, 1725 (2003). 
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of legal frameworks is thus questionable.167  While legal economists fend off criticism, the 
enormity of opposition to the behavioral law theory cannot be discounted.168  For example, even 
if parties agree to a mutually objective meaning of fairness, it is debatable whether commercial 
actors in a long-term contractual arrangement are willing to continue amicable future relations 
after a party breaches, particularly due to opportunism.   
Scholars melding strict behavioral law theory with economics169  studies face criticism that they 
oversimplify, if not over generalize, data concerning human understanding and rationalism in 
order to elevate them as important scholarly discoveries.170  Another significant criticism of 
behavioral theory is the discouragement of empirical data, crucial to developing significant 
conclusions of the effectiveness of legal rules.171  Mitchell concludes that:  
“Intelligent predictions of the behavioral effects of alternative legal policies depend on 
reliable data regarding (i) the relative frequency of rational and nonrational behavior 
across persons and situations and (ii) the resistance of nonrational behavior to 
incentives and debiasing mechanisms that may be available through the legal and 
economic systems.  Currently, psychology, behavioral economics, and behavioral law and 
economics provide only limited answers to these empirical questions because they fail to 
examine legal decision-making in all its complexity and variety. For instance, recognition 
of the research on individual and situational differences in rationality discussed here 
would better inform the legal system on ways in which it could redress cognitive 
imperfections and irrationality.”172 
 
167 Mitchell, Gregory, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and 
Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 Geo. L. J. 67 (2002) (“[b]ehavioral law and economics treats all legal actors in all 
situations as if they were equally predisposed to commit errors of judgment and choice”).  
168 Rostain, Tanina, Educating Homo Economicus: Cautionary Notes on the New Behavior And Law and Economics 
Movement, 34 Law & Soc’y Rev. 973, 984 (2000) (“[W]e are still a long way from arriving at a broad, predicatively 
powerful account of human behavior, and….we are not likely ever to achieve it. It is not clear, for one, how easy it 
is to turn laboratory results into observations about how human beings will behave in “the field”).  But see 
Mitchell, Gregory, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics’ 
Equal Incompetence, 91 Geo. L. J. 67 (2002): “Law and economics’ perfect rationality assumption is drawn from 
neoclassical microeconomic theory and is refutable as an empirical matter because empirical studies often find 
participants whose behavior systematically deviates from economic definitions of rationality. Proponents of law 
and economics acknowledge this descriptive inaccuracy but retain the assumption for lack of a better alternative 
for prediction and policy analysis.” 
169 See Rostain, Tanina, Educating Homo Economicus: Cautionary Notes on the New Behavior and Law and Economics 
Movement, 34 Law & Soc’y Rev. 973, 978 (2000) (“People reason poorly about risk, tend to jump too quickly to 
erroneous conclusions from incomplete information, and are otherwise poor statisticians”).   
170 Mitchell, Gregory, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and 
Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 Geo. L. J. 67, 72 (2002). 
171 Posner, Richard A., Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1551, 1575 (1998) 
(arguing that “experts” can behave irrationally and that behavioral economics implies a “cure” for “cognitive quirks 
and weakness of will” that thwart rational behavior). 
172 Mitchell, Gregory, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and 
Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 Geo. L. J. 67, 75 (2002). 
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Relatedly, tracking deviations from rational thought and behavior through statistical review 
would presumably show trends of rational thought intermingled with irrational behavior—an 
endeavor which must account for great statistical volatility.173 
Practitioners and legal scholars often fail to recognize market implications and, in such 
situations, sociological research could offer a comparativist useful support.  An economist, 
however, may note the positive, or negative, financial results following an effected contract, the 
product of a bargaining which may have never occurred unless both parties experienced some 
degrees of social comfort, or need, to include certain contractual clauses as “protective” 
mechanisms.  The motivations for instituting such provisions could range broadly, whether it be 
assessing possible agreement breach costs or creating a needed understanding of the roles and 
expectations of the contracting parties.  The positive social effects of the successful contract, 
such as increased corporate morale or heightened job satisfaction, also cannot be discounted.  
For these factors, using behavioral law theory as the sole methodological tool to review a 
comparative commercial law issue, ignoring economics, is not sufficient. 
3.3 Socio-economic Hybrid Tool: Relational Contracting 
Another objective tool measuring law-in-action within comparative commercial contracting 
problems is relational contracting.  Discrete and long-term contracts are difficult to define, and 
the expectations and understanding of parties under single or multiple agreements may be 
unclear.  Contractual relationalism involves various contracts or relations which may “relate” in 
different senses, and degrees.174  Under Macneil’s “relational model,” contracts serve as aspects 
of relationships which, in themselves, are not governed by contractual intentions.  Rather, the 
relations are influenced by social and conduct normatives emerging from and inside that 
relationship.175  Contracting parties accept their contracts within such relationship.176  
Accordingly, the parties “relationships” under relational contracts have: 
“the propensity to generate norms, define or inform parties’ expectations, provide 
sources of reassurance, facilitate co-operation, create interdependence (and so on) – – 
over and above, indeed potentially instead of, what can be gleaned from the express 
terms of the contract or contracts to which they are parties, and over and above what is 
 
173 Id. at 77 (“Ultimately, the choice of behavioral assumptions to guide policy will depend to some extent on value 
preferences and unrealistic or untestable assumptions about human nature, because while empirical research can 
provide better answers than we currently have, it will not provide incontestable or simple answers about legal 
rationality for prescriptive use”). 
174 See Eisenberg, Melvin A., Why there is No Law of Relational Contracts, 94 NW U LR 805, 813 (2005); Kimel, 
Dori, The Choice of Paradigm for Theory of Contract: Reflections on The Relational Model, 27 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 233, 
235 (2007).   
175 Thompson, Robert, B., Value Creation By Lawyers Within Relational Contracts and in Noisy Environments, 74 
Oregon Law Review 315, 317 (1995) (“Relational contracting recognizes that parties often do not come together as 
strangers making discrete, self-contained contracts but rather interact in an expectation of an ongoing relationship 
in which the prospect of future exchanges will shape the parties interactions and the remedies they choose”). 
176 Eisenberg, Melvin A., Why There is No Law of Relational Contracts, 94 N.W. Univ. Law Rev. 805, 816 (2005). 
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provided by the bare legal norms and legal mechanisms that underlie or support these 
contracts in the relevant jurisdiction.”177 
The relational contract is distinguished from the discrete, single or “one shot” transaction 
approach, generally isolated from relationship factors amassed through the parties’ 
interaction.178  Relational contract theory is thus viewed as emphasizing the interdependence of 
individuals in relationships.179  
From an economic perspective, using a relational contract methodology raises a problematic 
situation: it is difficult to predict events in the future, and thus contracting parties are unable to 
allocate distant payments or obligations which maximize the contractual value.180  At a point 
during a long-term contract, for example, the agreement’s parties would then necessarily 
consider renegotiation.  Such is the circular reasoning: “if the parties expect to renegotiate, then 
they cannot bind themselves to a contract, in which case the party whom events throw in the 
vulnerable position will be at the mercy of the party whom events favor.”181   
Relational contract theorists propose the removal of some contractual provisions, and recognize 
implied provisions, such as broadening the range of excuses for non-performance.182  The 
relationship between the contracting parties thus assumes an integral position, with a legal 
theorist suggesting that the contract’s nature involves pre-conceived notions of the contracting 
parties overturning conventional wisdom.183  But allegations that contracts mirror all aspects of 
 
177 Kimel, Dori, The Choice of Paradigm for Theory of Contract: Reflections on The Relational Model, 27 Oxford J. Legal 
Stud. 233, 235 (2007).  See also Gordon, R.W., Macaulay, Macneil, and the Discovery of Solidarity and Power in 
Contract Law, Wisc. Law Rev. 565, 569 (1985) (Relational contract parties “treat their contracts more like 
marriages than like one night stands,” noting that relationship contracts involve those that change according to 
circumstances and signify a “commitment to cooperate”). 
178 Kimel, Dori, The Choice of Paradigm for Theory of Contract: Reflections on the Relational Model, 27 Oxford J. Legal 
Stud. 233, 237 (2007).   
179 Macneil, Ian R., Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational 
Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. Rev. 854 (1978); see also Posner, Eric A., A Theory of Contract Law under Conditions of 
Radical Judicial Error, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 749, 751 (2000) (Asserting that under relational theory courts implicitly, or 
explicitly, accept the parties relational contracting); Kimel, Dori, The Choice of Paradigm for Theory of Contract: 
Reflections on The Relational Model, 27 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 233, 243 (2007); Macauley, Stewart, Relational Contracts 
Floating on a Sea of Custom? Thoughts about the Ideas of Ian Macneil and Lisa Bernstein, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev 775, 800 
(2000).   
180 Posner, Eric A., A Theory Of Contract Law Under Conditions of Radical Judicial Error, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 749, 751 
(2000).   
181 See id. 
182 See id. 
183 Dori Kimel suggests that the contracting parties: “do not see the terms of the contract to which they are party as 
a conclusive list of fixed rights and obligations, but rather as merely a starting point for re-negotiation and 
adjustment when circumstances change or difficulties arise  parties in practice not insisting upon their contractual 
rights and not taking too seriously the option of litigation, but rather exhibiting the ongoing willingness to make 
the necessary adjustments in order to continue to co-operate; parties not having very precise or fully articulated 
aims in entering contractual relations in the first place, but rather merely a vague desire to establish a relationship 
and “take it from there”; and so on. Armed with this kind of data, the constructive part of the relational argument 
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human interaction, and that concepts not encapsulated within the contractual rubric are thus 
invalid, may be challenged as too expansive. Deeming that human and commercial relationships 
may be “contractualized” has spurred additional debate.  Namely, one questions the alternatives 
to contract: under what framework will certain relationships remain outside the ambit of a 
contract?  Moreover, in such relational context, the elements of the parties’ interactions that 
shall be included or excluded (purposefully or otherwise) under an agreement, must be 
examined.184 
The balancing act between personal and professional relationships, moving beyond the essential 
contractual terms, has been proposed to be a “detached code,” consisting of 
“a certain stable baseline, comprising of clearly articulated, for the most part enforceable 
rights and obligations, which can be relied upon to provide at least a modicum of 
assurance or a safety-net of sorts in case of an unforeseen breakdown of the relationship, 
and which is relatively immune from being eroded as a result of, say, the on-going desire 
to co-operate rather than part ways, supererogation, displays of flexibility or gestures of 
goodwill--indeed all those positive things that can develop around the contractual core 
and that in the life of the relationship may well become more central and more important 
and more determinative of the parties’ conduct than any or all express terms.”185 
Utilizing a relational contract methodology, without any economic or traditional sociological 
considerations, does not create a fulsome analytical tool.  Relational contracting’s valuable law-
in-action insights, however, play a string complementary role which should not be ignored. 
4 Conclusion: How to use Objective Pluralism, The Comparative Law 
Bridge 
The exploration of common and civil law divides, both in form and substance, demonstrates that 
black-letter law analysis provides necessary and important insights when analyzing legal 
concepts implicit in international business transactions.  Good faith, as discussed, is a relevant 
example as to how a legal concept may be treated differently among (and within) legal systems.  
But black letter analysis should not be the only prism to evaluate legal problems transcending 
legal systems.  Rather, a law-in-action review provides valuable insights into what motivates 
 
here is that theory of contract must systematically reflect this reality; it must bear out such facts, and do away with 
the largely fictitious vision of contract that emerges from a study of its established, formal rules….”  Kimel, Dori, 
The Choice of Paradigm for Theory of Contract: Reflections on The Relational Model, 27 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 233, 253 
(2007). 
184 Eisenberg warns that this tendency to contractualize all relationships “obscures critical differences between 
economic and affective relationships, between explicit and tacit reciprocity, between relationships that should be 
enforceable by both law and social norms and relationships that should be enforceable only by social norms, and 
between relationships that are triggered by promise and relationships that are not.”  Eisenberg, Melvin A., Why 
There Is No Law of Relational Contracts, 94 N.W. Univ. L. Rev 805, 820 (2000). 
185 Kimel, Dori, The Choice of Paradigm for Theory of Contract: Reflections on The Relational Model, 27 Oxford J. Legal 
Stud. 233, 248 (2007). 
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business parties and how legal concepts are interpreted in the real world.  These issues are 
particularly relevant to practitioners and business people charged with designing an 
international transaction and/or drafting relevant agreements.  Such areas are also of import to 
comparative law scholars, needing to discern the true meaning behind words and concepts, 
precluded from considering a legal issue only on its face.  
Objective pluralism entails reviewing a comparative law problem from economic, sociological 
and, as applicable, relational contracting perspectives.  Presenting such multiple vantage points 
allows a comparativist or practitioner a full palate, with the ability to observe what factors 
influence law-in-action on a case-by-case basis.  But how does one accomplish this task?  
Engaging in an objective pluralistic approach necessarily involves constructing scientifically-
sound surveys or empirical studies to weigh the various social, economic and relational contract 
considerations. 
The legal scholar Lisa Bernstein’s extensive law and economics scholarship evidences that 
carefully-construed surveys and studies, testing black-letter law through a law-in-action 
viewpoint, yields important insights. Bernstein has analyzed several trades and legal 
frameworks, all through the lens of formal and informal contract enforcement.  For example, 
Bernstein’s significant, in-depth review of the diamond industry discussed relational contracts 
under a trade context. 186  Her commercially-focused study in that industry concluded that 
reputation was “an essential business asset whose value will often be reflected in the selection of 
transactional partners as well as in the transaction price, the transaction structure, and other 
terms.”187   
Reviewing law and economics scholarship dedicated to investigating the factors shaping the 
conduct of actors in specific industries reveals the commercial considerations ultimately 
influencing how contracts are drafted, negotiated and enforced.  Important factors such as 
reputation, otherwise not captured in conventional black-letter law review, provide insights into 
the strengths, and possible weakness, in studied legal regimes.188  For example, Bernstein’s 
empirical review of private arbitration systems revealed the striking importance of achieving 
and maintaining excellent industry reputations, and the value of reputation-based non-legal 
sanctions.189  
 
186 See, e.g., Bernstein, Lisa, Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J 
Legal Stud 115 (1992); Bernstein, Lisa, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2’s Incorporation Strategy: A 
Preliminary Study, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 710 (1999).   
187 Bernstein, Lisa D., Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation through Rules, Norms, and 
Institutions, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1724, 1737 (2001).  
188 See, e.g., Bernstein, Lisa, Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J 
Legal Stud 115 (1992); Bernstein, Lisa, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2’s Incorporation Strategy: A 
Preliminary Study, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 710 (1999).  Bernstein, Lisa D., Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: 
Creating Cooperation through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1724, 1737 (2001).   
189 Id. at 1724. She interviewed a cotton merchant, who noted that “You want to do business where you know 
people and can depend on what they say about quality, since it is so subtle and so subjective. You are more likely to 
rely on quality when you know the guy.”  Id. at 1746.   
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Bernstein’s review of the U.S. cotton industry provides an excellent example of relational 
contracting influences.  Her study discussed how the cotton industry opted out of the public 
legal system, replacing it with a private commercial law mechanism.190  Contracts in that 
industry were concluded under privately drafted sets of contract default rules, and made subject 
to arbitration in one of several merchant tribunals.  Based upon her review, which included 
extensive interviews with industry leaders, arbitration awards were both respected and 
promptly complied with, and that the industry’s private law system kept “transactions costs, 
error costs, legal system costs, and collection costs” low.191  These insights assist practitioners 
when considering private legal system alternatives to the public judicial system.  Additionally, 
before undertaking her empirical study, Bernstein presupposed that the cotton industry 
arbitration system would be less formalistic and more pragmatic than a public judicial fora.  Her 
research revealed that this was not necessarily the case, as industry arbitrators employed 
formalistic procedures in an adjudicative approach, placing less emphasis on custom and usage, 
“even when their sense of fairness suggests that additional considerations are relevant or that a 
contrary result should be reached.”192  Accordingly, these insights assist academics analyzing 
comparative legal structures—insights which would not have been discovered without an 
empirical study analyzing “law in action.”   
Carefully-construed surveys and empirical studies193 may provide deep insights into possible 
sociological, economic, relationship and cultural aspects which factor into the construction and 
operation of a studied legal problem. 194  Presenting inquiries, which allow ample opportunity 
for explanation, from a broad, yet relevant, societal sampling creates needed points of reference.  
All the discussed review methods independently do not provide a fulsome picture.  As noted, 
behavior is inconsistent by definition.  Relationships influence behavior—but those 
 
190 Bernstein, Lisa D., Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation through Rules, Norms, and 
Institutions, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1724 (2001).   
191 Id. at 1725-1726. 
192 Bernstein, Lisa D., Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation through Rules, Norms, and 
Institutions, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1724, 1737 (2001).  She noted that one interviewed arbitrator proposed that: “[w]e 
look to the contract and then to the trade rules; this is all we have to base it [our decision] on.  Other things like 
custom and the background [of the deal] are infinitely variable so we don't look to them.”  Id. 
193 There is evident tension among many legal scholars who employ purely economic, or wholly sociological, legal 
review strategies.  Ayres, Ian, Never Confuse Efficiency with a Liver Complaint, 1997 Wis. L. Rev. 503, 506 & n.12 
(“Sociology is bad journalism,” statement attributed to an anonymous historian). See also Posner, Richard A., The 
Sociology of the Sociology of Law: A View from Economics, 2 Eur. J.L. & Econ. 265, 275 (1995) (criticizing “Law and 
Sociology” for having no “general theory of human behavior”). Employing strictly social research has spurred 
criticism in other disciplines, including family law. See Ramsey, Sarah H., Using Social Science Research in Family Law 
Analysis and Formation: Problems and Prospect, 3 S. Cal. Interdisc. L. J. 630, 633 (1994) citing to Deech, Ruth, Divorce 
Law and Empirical Studies, 106 L. Q. Rev. 229 (1990) (“the influence of the social scientists has led to an apparent 
reduction in the intellectual challenge and content of the law”). 
194 Bernstein, Lisa, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Value Creation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 
99 Mich. L. Rev. 1724 (2001) (Evidencing the interconnection of economic, behavioral and relational contracting 
issues in one of the scholar’s interviews: “Over time a buyer gets the idea that he wants to deal with me not just 
because of our business relationship, but also because of our personal relationship. So you tell me, when you want 
to do business who will you call, the guy you like or the guy you don’t like”). 
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relationships also admittedly are influenced by economics.  An economics-based approach must 
focus on two independent elements—efficiency and transaction costs—which may often 
intersect.  Economic reviews must also confront the assumption that humans behave rationally 
in a transaction’s decision-making.  Rationality in an economic sense also does not take into 
consideration human indecisiveness, or the value of sociology.  Objective pluralism, 
incorporating all such elements, reveals the problem.   
Given the black-letter law divergences among the common and civil legal systems concerning 
“good faith,” a serious study into aspects of that doctrine should be undertaken, providing 
scholars and practitioners needed law-in-action perspectives to see how striking the actual 
divide is between both legal traditions within this contractual doctrine.195  The divergence in the 
common and civil law interpretations of good faith undermines the arguments of comparativists 
advocating the strengths of common and civil law systemic convergence, an increasingly 
popular196 and hotly contested topic in modern comparative law.197  With respect to 
comparative law, convergence refers to “the phenomenon of similar solutions reached by 
different legal systems from different points of departure.”198  The success of importing legal 
transplants from one regime to another indicates the possibility of convergence.199  Scholars 
agree that within the civil law framework, the laws of individual states, particularly Germany, 
have influenced European Union law, leading to the EU-wide adoption of certain obligations.200 
Influence should not, however, be misidentified as supporting convergence.  For example, 
Pejovic, encouraged by systemic convergence, has stressed the increasing role of common and 
 
195 Note that good faith was indirectly analyzed in the context of an empirical study reviewing liquidated damages 
clauses under the Norwegian and U.S. legal regimes. See Canuel, Edward T., Analyzing Norwegian and U.S. 
Contractual Damages Clauses: A Comparative Approach, published with the University of Oslo Faculty of Law 
(2009), ISSN 1890-2375.  
196 Nottage, Luke, Comment on Civil Law and Common Law:  Two Different Paths Leading to the Same Goal, 32 
VUWLR 843, 848 (arguing that convergence theorists form “the majority view”) (2001) 
197 The statement of noted American comparativist John Henry Merryman indicates the tenor of this scholarly 
debate, as he stated that: “In some cases the desire for convergence of legal systems merely expresses a yearning for 
simplicity. It responds to popular discontent with complexity and seeks to impose order where there is untidy 
diversity. This approach to legal diversity would hardly merit recognition and discussion, since it is little more than 
an expression of frustration at the fact that the world is complicated, disorderly and uncertain, were it not so firmly 
rooted in human psychology. It is closely related to an exaggerated demand for certainty in the law.” 
Nottage, Luke, Comment on Civil Law and Common Law: Two Different Paths Leading to the Same Goal, 32 VUWLR 
843, 849 found at www.upf.pf/IMG/doc/17Nottage.doc (2001) citing to Merryman, John Henry, On the 
Convergence (and Divergence) of the Civil Law and the Common Law in The Loneliness of the Comparative 
Lawyer and Other Essays in Foreign and Comparative Law 17, 27 (1999). 
198 Mattei, Ugo and Alberto Monti, Abstract: Comparative Law and Economics 505,508 (1999) at 
http://encyclo.findlaw.com/0560book.pdf. 
199 See id. 
200 See Cordero Moss, Giuditta, Commercial Contracts Between Consumer Protection and Trade Usages: Some Observations 
on the Importance of State Contract Law, in Schulze, R. (ed.), Common Frame of Reference and Existing EC 
Contract Law, 65, 67 (2008), citing to Schlectriem, P., The Functions of General Clauses in Grundmann, Stefan 
and Denis Mazeaud (eds.), General Clauses and Standards in European Contract Law: Comparative Law, EC law 
and Contract Law Codification 41, 45, et. seq. (2006) (suggesting that BGB §242’s ancillary obligations were 
codified by Community directives). 
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civil law harmonization through international treaties, conventions and laws containing 
elements of both civil and common law, such as the CISG.201  Another scholar notes, however, 
that within Europe the opposing views of good faith and fair dealing under the English common 
law and civil law regimes question the reality of such convergence.202  Most specifically 
“[i]f a common-law inspired contract is governed by a law from a civil jurisdiction, many 
of its clauses will not be interpreted literally and the exercise of rights and remedies 
regulated in the contract will be mitigated, supplemented or corrected by the principle of 
good faith and fair dealing present, in varying degrees, in the legal family of civil law. If 
the same contract is governed by English law, most of its clauses will be interpreted and 
applied literally.”203 
With respect to the import of transnational agreements or conventions buttressing claims of 
convergence, the scholar suggests that skeptics may find such agreements contain vague 
principles with inexact content, which question assertions that they demonstrate an actual legal 
convergence, in practice.204 
The debate continues, and objective pluralism should be considered when reviewing a 
comparative commercial law issue.  As Aesop suggests, appearances are often deceiving.  One 
must understand the disparities existing in good faith doctrine, examining comparative 
contractual clauses as written and analyzing how such clauses manifest themselves in practice. 
 
201 Pejovic, Caslav, Civil Law and Common Law: Two Different Paths Leading to the Same Goal, 32 VUWLR 817, 838 
(2001) at www.upf.pf/IMG/doc/16Pejovic.doc. 
202 See, generally, Cordero Moss, Giuditta, Commercial Contracts Between Consumer Protection and Trade Usages: Some 
Observations on the Importance of State Contract Law, in Schulze, R. (ed.), Common Frame of Reference and Existing 
EC Contract Law 65 (2008). 
203 Cordero Moss, Giuditta, Commercial Contracts Between Consumer Protection and Trade Usages: Some Observations on 
the Importance of State Contract Law, in Schulze, R. (ed.), Common Frame of Reference and Existing EC Contract 
Law, 65, 77-78 (2008).  Supporting this point, the scholar also provides notes that merger clauses have specific 
contractual clauses which have different interpretations under English law and civil law. See id. at 79. 
204 See id.  For example, it is noted that the CISG is silent on the issue of good faith as a duty between contracting 
parties. See id. at 83. Compare with Pejovic, Caslav, Civil Law and Common Law: Two Different Paths Leading to the 
Same Goal, 32 VUWLR 817, 839-840 (2001): “The differences which exist between civil law and common law 
should not be exaggerated. It is also important to note that differences on many issues exist both among civil law 
and among common law countries. The differences between civil law and common law systems are more in styles 
of argumentation and methodology than in the content of legal norms. By using different means, both civil law 
and common law are aimed at the same goal and similar results are often obtained by different reasoning. The fact 
that common law and civil law, despite the use of different means arrive at the same or similar solutions is not 
surprising, as the subject-matter of the legal regulation and the basic values in both legal systems are more or less 
the same.” 
